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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Seven Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

OVER a period of almost four decades Soviet foreign policy has been flexible in tactics, consistent in long range strategy. Whether it was the decadent aristocrat Chicherin or the stout, bourgeois-looking underground-revolutionary Litvinov, or the gruff and icy Molotov who was technically in charge of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet diplomacy, through all its twists and turns and zigzags sought to serve three ends.

These were the keeping in power of the existing regime, the satisfaction of pre-war Russian nationalist aspirations, and the promotion of the ultimate Communist objective: international Communist revolution. When this third objective clashed too flagrantly with the other two its immediate realization would be shelved or postponed.

But the Soviet leaders have never renounced or forgotten their ultimate goal of a Communist "One World"; they have affirmed it even in the shadow of "the spirit of Geneva." And there is no such inherent contradiction or inconsistency between Russian national territorial and strategic objectives and the promotion of world revolution as is sometimes believed. The international fifth column of subservient Communist parties which was called into existence to advance the cause of world revolution has been a useful instrument for achieving and consolidating Russian national ambitions, such as the large postwar annexations in Eastern and Central Europe. The absorption of more manpower, territory, and natural resources into the Soviet-controlled Russian state strengthens the drive to make Communism dominant throughout the world.

Chameleonlike in its readiness to make surface changes, Soviet foreign policy has been unbending in long-range strategy. The Soviet government is capable of making overnight shifts of action which could not be carried out without a long period of preparation by governments which derive their power from the consent and approval of the governed. Because organized political opposition, independent newspapers and other agencies for creating a public opinion apart from government control do not exist under Soviet

rule, the men who direct Soviet foreign policy are able to reverse friendships and enmities at a moment's notice for the sake of unchanging interests.

Leon Trotsky, before he was assassinated in Mexico, noted with wry humor how he was forced to serve the interests of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Soviet relations with Great Britain were bad he was represented as "Mister Trotsky," agent of Anglo-American capital. When Poland was an object of Soviet ire Trotsky became "Pan Trotsky," hireling of the Polish intelligence. When Germany and Japan came in the range of Soviet fire Trotsky was Herr Trotsky or Trotsky-san, scheming to give away Soviet provinces to German and Japanese imperialists.

One can distinguish seven ages or phases of Soviet foreign policy, which may be summarized as follows.

(1) All-out revolutionary offensive against the "bourgeois" world (1917-1921). During this period there was no attempt to camouflage or disguise the sympathy of the leaders of the Soviet government with international Communist movements.

Typical of the spirit of this period is a decree of December 24, 1917, published in the official Soviet newspaper, *Izvestiya*, placing at the disposal of "the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs" the sum of two million rubles "for the needs of the international revolutionary movement." This use of Soviet missions abroad as centers of subversion and espionage has never ceased, as the revelations of such defectors as Gouzenko in Canada and Petrov in Australia make clear. But it was only in the early days of the Soviet regime that this combination of the functions of diplomat and paymaster of forces of revolution was openly avowed.

Lenin and Stalin on December 3, 1917 signed an appeal urging the "toiling Moslems of the East" to throw off "the robbers and enslavers of European imperialism." It was lack of power, not lack of will that prevented the Soviet government from fulfilling Lenin's teaching and giving armed aid to revolutionary movements in other countries. A plan to come to the help of Bela Kun's Communist regime in Hungary was thwarted by widespread anti-Communist peasant revolts in the Ukraine and the growing success of the White Army of General Denikin in the spring of 1919.

The rejection of Polish peace offers and British mediation suggestions and the drive on to Warsaw in the summer of 1920 was motivated not by territorial demands, but by the hope that Poland could be communized. The smashing defeat of the Red Army after it reached the outskirts of the Polish capital ended this dream.

This was a period of actual, if undeclared war with the victorious powers of the First World War. There was military intervention by American and British forces in North Russia, by the French (for a very brief period) in the Ukraine, by Japanese and Americans in Eastern Siberia. There was also military aid to such anti-Bolshevik leaders as General Denikin in the South and Admiral Kolchak in Siberia.

(2) Defensive Isolationism. By 1921 the extreme ambitions of Russian revolutionaries and of allied interventionists had failed. The flame of revolution had failed to spread from Russia to other lands. The White movements on which the interventionists had based their hopes had been defeated and crushed. The stage was set for a period of uneasy and distrustful "co-existence." (This very word was first used by Stalin in a speech in 1925.)

During this period the Soviet government regarded Great Britain and France and the French allies in Eastern Europe, especially Poland and Rumania, as its most dangerous enemies. A primary objective of Soviet diplomacy was to keep Germany out of any anti-Soviet combination. United States-Soviet relations were very restricted because of the non-recognition policy followed by the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations. Individual Americans, however, were perhaps better treated in this period than at any subsequent time, because the Soviet government, angling for recognition, was on its best behavior. There were no arbitrary arrests and show trials of American engineers, as there were of German and British.

It was the avowed policy of the Soviet government at this time to have nothing to do with the League of Nations, which it professed to regard as a sinister capitalist international, to abstain from alliances itself and to do everything in its power to block alliances among its neighbors, in which it always suspected anti-Soviet intention. The preferred Soviet diplomatic device was the bilateral non-aggression and neutrality pact. These pacts contained no enforcement or sanction provisions, merely pledging the partners not to resort to aggression against each other and to neutrality in case the other partner was subjected to attack. Agreements of this kind were concluded with Turkey in 1925, with Germany and Lithuania in 1926, with Iran in 1927, and with Afghanistan in 1931. In 1932 the Soviet Union concluded non-aggression treaties with its Western neighbors, Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia, and also with France.

While Moscow remained a center of revolutionary activity as the headquarters of the Comintern and Soviet financial support was quickly extended to the British general strike in 1926, while Soviet military, political, and economic agents were notably active in China during the years of nationalist revolutionary upsurge, in 1926 and 1927, the Red Army was kept within the Soviet frontiers. No action likely to precipitate war was risked.

(3) Popular Front (1934-1938). The rise of Nazi Germany and of militarist Japan helped to bring about a new phase in the policy of the Soviet government and of its instrument, the Comintern. The Soviet ostensible orientation shifted from Germany to the Western powers. Alliances were concluded with France and with Czechoslovakia. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov advocated collective security in speeches before the League of Nations at Geneva. The Soviet government entered the League of Nations as Germany and Japan withdrew.

There was a parallel change in the tactics of Communist parties outside of Russia. So-called "popular front" alliances were sought with socialists, hitherto denounced as lackeys of capitalism, and even with nonsocialist groups. The Soviet purpose: to promote a clash between the Western powers on one side and Germany and Italy, on the other, is clear. What is by no means so clear is whether the Soviet Union would have backed up Great Britain and France if war had broken out over such issues as Ethiopia, Spain, or Czechoslovakia. Later developments strongly suggest that the Soviet government would more probably have remained on the sidelines, gleefully contemplating the spectacle of its "capitalist" enemies wearing each other out in war.

(4) Aggressive Isolationism (1939-1941). As early as the Eighteenth Conference of the Communist Party, in March, 1939, it was clear that the Soviet Union was departing from its ostensible Western orientation. Stalin at this Conference ridiculed alleged attempts of Great Britain and France to incite Germany against the Soviet Union. On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Ambassador to Germany, Merekalov, paid his first visit to the German State Secretary in the Foreign Office, von Weizsaecker, and made overtures for better relations between the two countries. On May 3 Molotov replaced Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

There was a double significance in this change. Litvinov was the symbol of collective security and pro-Western sympathy. And, as a Jew, he would have been an awkward agent for the closer relations

with Nazi Germany which Stalin contemplated. As events moved more rapidly toward the outbreak of World War II, Stalin carried on a double set of negotiations, a public set with Great Britain and France, a secret set with Hitler and Ribbentrop.

The world was stunned by the announcement of a Soviet-Nazi pact of "neutrality and non-aggression" on August 23. There was much more in this pact than met the eye. For a secret supplementary agreement divided up Poland and the Baltic republics between the two totalitarian regimes. When Soviet troops marched into Poland, already shattered by the Nazi onslaught, on September 17, 1939, this was not, as Professor Frederick L. Schumann asserted in a recent letter in *The New York Times*, a reaction to the German invasion of Poland. It was the implementation of a deal which had been struck before the German armies began to move.

The Soviet share of the loot was the eastern half of Poland and the three Baltic Republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939 and wrested from that country about one tenth of its territory, including the old Finnish city of Viipuri. As a result of this act of unprovoked aggression, the Soviet Union was expelled from membership in the League of Nations.

(5) Wartime Alliance with the West (1941-1946). The period of aggressive isolationism, in which the Soviet Union acted as a benevolent neutral toward Nazi Germany, came to an end abruptly, when Hitler hurled his principal military forces against the Soviet Union in June, 1941. The Soviet Union had always been a principal objective of Hitler's expansionist ambition.

An initial blow to Soviet-Nazi collaboration occurred when Molotov irritated Hitler by what the Nazi leader considered excessive demands at a conference in Berlin in November, 1940. In the following month instructions were given to prepare Operation Barbarossa, an invasion of the Soviet Union. Stalin, warned of the impending blow from several sources, tried desperately to avoid it by several gestures of appeasement, such as the expulsion from Moscow of representatives of Yugoslavia and of some governments-in-exile.

But Hitler's decision had been taken and the German invasion of Russia ushered in an era of wartime alliance with the Western powers. The Soviet Union entered into formal alliances with Great Britain in 1942, with France in 1944. As a concession to Western opinion the Communist International dissolved itself in 1943, although subsequent events indicated no change in the slavish

dependence of foreign Communist parties on instructions from Moscow.

Top level wartime conferences between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill (with Truman replacing Roosevelt at Potsdam and Attlee taking over from Churchill during the latter part of that conference) at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam secured to the Soviet Union some very substantial and tangible spoils of war. The Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland was sanctioned, although the demarcation line was slightly more favorable to Poland than the Molotov-Ribbentrop line had been. Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, although not officially confirmed, was silently accepted. There was acquiescence in the mass expulsion of Germans and people of German origin from the area east of the Oder-Neisse line. The Soviet Union obtained, as the price of intervention in the war with Japan, South Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, Outer Mongolia and important military and economic concessions in Manchuria.

(6) The Cold War (1946-1953). Even before the death of President Roosevelt (like his chief adviser, Harry Hopkins, a determined optimist about the prospects of "getting along" with Stalin) the bonds of the wartime alliance were wearing thin. A principal cause of the cold war which followed the era of military collaboration was the complete failure of the Soviet government to implement its promises to assure "free and unfettered elections" in Poland and democratic methods in other countries occupied by the Red Army. There was a similar disregard of the rights of non-Communist parties in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The discovery that Soviet spy rings had been operating on a large scale in Canada and in the United States just when the atmosphere of trusting confidence had been at its height was another factor for estrangement.

Still another cause was the Soviet policy of pressing for ever greater expansion, with territorial demands on Turkey, promotion of a Communist uprising in Greece, etc. The official Soviet attitude toward foreigners became extremely hostile and suspicious. Laws and regulations were put into effect which made social and intellectual contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners virtually impossible. Soviet wives of foreigners were forbidden to leave Russia and a law was issued forbidding Soviet citizens to marry foreigners.

At times the cold war seemed to be taking on a hot character. A Soviet blockade of West Berlin, designed to force the Western powers out of the former German capital, was frustrated by a gigantic American air lift. Invasion of South Korea in June, 1950

by a well-trained North Korean army, equipped with modern weapons by the Soviet Union, led to large scale war, with Communist China entering hostilities and the United States bearing the brunt of the military aid to South Korea, although some United Nations members contributed token contingents.

(7) Smiling Non-Cooperation (1953-). Stalin's death marked the beginning of a transition to a policy of outward amiability, accompanied by inflexibility as regards the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy. Some of the more extreme restrictions on foreigners in the Soviet Union were dropped or relaxed. More visas were granted to foreign visitors.

The Korean fighting ended when the Chinese and North Korean negotiators, after a long deadlock, dropped their demand for the forced return of the many war prisoners who preferred to leave their Communist-ruled homelands. An armistice was signed in Korea in July, 1953. The war in Indo-China came to an end a year later, with a demarcation line drawn between a Communist state in North and a non-Communist state in the South and an agreement, of dubious practicality, for an election to be held in the whole country in 1956.

Giving up the negative position it had maintained for ten years, the Soviet government consented to take part in complete military evacuation of Austria in 1955 and a "summit" conference of heads of the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France was held at Geneva in July of the same year. This conference abounded in professions of mutual esteem and desire for peace and was widely publicized in countries behind the iron curtain with a view to showing the hopelessness of further resistance to Communist rule.

However, a second conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Geneva in October-November, 1955, failed to reach a single agreement on such disputed issues as the reunification of Germany in freedom, disarmament, and freer cultural interchange. Indeed Soviet policy on the German question hardened appreciably after the first Geneva conference. Free elections for the whole of Germany have been spurned and the Soviet government is using all means of pressure to obtain international recognition for the handpicked dictatorial regime which it has set up in its Zone of Occupation.

A large sale of arms through Czechoslovakia to Egypt indicated a Soviet desire to fish in the troubled waters of the Near East. The new Soviet leaders, Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev

and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin delivered a series of inflammatory speeches against the West during a tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan. This newest, seventh age of Soviet foreign policy did not seem to promise peace and stabilization, but rather a continuation of intensive political competition by any and all means short of large-scale war.

The Soviet Design for a World Language

BY ELLIOT R. GOODMAN

THE Soviet grand design to transform the present nation-state system into a Soviet World State envisages a fundamental reshaping of national languages. The Stalinist era produced a number of striking and explicit statements which both foretold the doom of national languages and predicted the formation of a single world language.

Stalin's contributions were based upon assumptions implicit in Lenin's vision of a socialist world state. Lenin foresaw the assimilation of nations and the formation of a single proletarian world culture. This would presumably include a single world language, although Lenin's actual statements on national languages were confined to the Russian Empire. He approved of the widespread use of a single language, in this case Russian, in a multi-national state as a means of unifying and centralizing power in large state units, as would be required under socialism. Yet he opposed coercion to foist the use of Russian upon the non-Russian peoples. The natural development of economic intercourse, he felt, would cause everyone to adopt Russian voluntarily. Forceful Russification would only drive nations apart and thereby retard their assimilation. Each nation should therefore be given the freedom of using its own language as the first step towards the voluntary adoption of a single, common tongue.

This view, which Lenin advanced prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, underestimated the strength and tenacity of the national sentiment of the oppressed nations which were soon to be set free by the disintegration of the Russian Empire. The first few years after the revolution were consumed with the implementation of this first phase of development in which each nation rediscovered its own national traditions and language. At this point there was little talk of the second stage of development in which a common language would supersede the newly revitalized national languages. The suggestion of one common language for the Soviet Union was condemned as a deviation of Great Russian chauvinism, and even

the very prospect of a single world language came under attack. At the height of this period, in May 1925, Stalin said:

Certain persons (Kautsky, for example) talk of the creation of a single universal language and of the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism. I have very little faith in this theory of a single all-embracing language. Experience, in every case, does not speak for, but against this theory. Up until now the Socialist Revolution has not diminished, but increased the number of languages, since it has aroused the broad masses of humanity, pushed them onto the political stage and awakened a new life in a whole series of new nationalities, which were formerly unknown or almost unknown.¹

This statement was made upon the same occasion at which Stalin introduced the idea of a "culture, national in form and socialist in content." This formula was intended to set limits upon the further developments of nationalism, by standardizing the ideological content of each culture. Though it was somewhat less obvious, this formula also provided the basis for confining the development of national forms, among which language was the most important, to those modes of expression which Moscow chose to tolerate. The "national form" of a given culture, like its ideological content, was a highly manipulative concept, subject to official definition by Moscow. The handwriting on the wall now clearly warned that henceforth the integrative, not the disintegrative, phase of national development would gradually assume paramount importance. While in 1925 this formula was first directed at integrating the content of each national culture, within a decade it was also aimed at integrating the forms of national culture, including, first and foremost, the integration of national languages. Soon the vocabulary, syntax and even the script of these national languages were all subjected to violent and arbitrary alterations. Thus, when Stalin returned to the language discussion in 1929 and 1930, he no longer discredited the idea of a world language.

Stalin now claimed to revert to the Leninist tradition by acknowledging "Lenin's theses, namely, that with the victory of socialism on a *world scale*, national differences and national languages will begin to die away, that after this victory national languages will begin to be supplanted by one common language."² Though Stalin no longer scoffed at the emergence of a single world language,

¹Stalin, "O politicheskikh zadachakh Universiteta Narodov Vostoka," May 18, 1925, *Sochineniya*, VII, 138-9.

²Stalin, "Natsionalnyi vopros i Leninizm," March 18, 1929, *ibid.*, XI, 342 (italics, Stalin's).

neither did he accept Lenin's original assumptions on the integration of national cultures and languages. Before the revolution Lenin held that the assimilation of nations, which was already under way, would be greatly accelerated by the advent of socialism. Lenin would have rejected Stalin's assertion that national differences would only begin to die away after the world victory of socialism. Stalin sought to obscure this contradiction by again dragging Kautsky onto the stage. Kautsky was charged with assorted blunders, including the accusation that he "does not understand the mechanics of the development of nations and has no inkling of the colossal power of stability possessed by nations, and believes that the fusion of nations is possible long before the victory of socialism. . . ." Here Stalin obviously shifted the onus of the pre-revolutionary Bolshevik views onto Kautsky, since it is abundantly clear that, until hit by the actual impact of the revolution, neither Lenin nor Stalin had a real "inkling of the colossal power of stability possessed by nations."³

Stalin's 1925 condemnation of a world language was likewise explained away by a *leger de main*. It must have been evident, Stalin insisted, that his denial of a world language referred exclusively to the period of socialism in one country and not to the future period of world socialism. Actually, Stalin's 1925 statement had made no such distinction. But it was just this distinction upon which Stalin now wished to rest his theory of a world language. He looked forward to "the flowering of national cultures (and languages) in the period of the proletarian dictatorship in one country with the object of preparing the conditions for their dying away and merging into one common socialist culture (and into one common language) in the period of the victory of socialism in the entire world."⁴ This ultimate world language, Stalin indicated, "will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new."⁵

Whatever this new world language might be, Stalin warned that it could not be hurried into existence immediately after the creation of a Soviet World State, "at one stroke, by decree from above."⁶ This world language must evolve without coercion, and through a gradual

³Ibid., XI, 344.

⁴Stalin, "Politicheskii otchet Tsentralnogo Komiteta XVI S'ezda VKP(b)," June 27, 1930, *ibid.*, XII, 370.

⁵Stalin, "Zakluchitelnoe slovo po politicheskому отчету ТсК XVI Съезда ВКП(б)," July 2, 1930, *ibid.*, XIII, 5.

⁶Stalin, "Natsionalnyi vopros," *ibid.*, XI, 347.

series of stages. "It is a mistake to think that the first stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat will mark the beginning of the formation of a single common language." At this point the hitherto oppressed national cultures and national languages will find full freedom of expression. Only in the second stage of world socialism, when a single world socialist economy has been successful, constructed, "only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begin to take shape, for only in that stage will nations feel the need to have a common international language in addition to their own national languages, as a convenience of intercourse and as an aid to economic, cultural and political cooperation." In the beginning, Stalin anticipated that there might be several common international languages existing alongside national languages. The final stage will arrive when the world socialist economic system has fully consolidated its gains and, "when practice has convinced nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages." Only at this point will "national differences and languages begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations."⁷

These views, expressed in 1929, were fully upheld in the Soviet linguistics discussion of 1950, at which time Stalin further refined his description of the fate of national languages, both before and after the creation of a Soviet World State. "*Prior to the victory of socialism* on a world scale . . . when national and colonial oppression remains in effect, when national isolation and mutual distrust of nations are reinforced by state differences," Stalin held that the crossing of two languages "does not yield some new, third language" but rather "one of the languages usually comes out the victor, whereas the other dies away. . . ." On the other hand, "*after the victory of socialism* on a world scale . . . when national and colonial oppression has been liquidated, when national isolation and mutual distrust of nations have been replaced by mutual confidence and a drawing together of nations," then "national languages will have the opportunity freely to enrich one another on the basis of cooperation." At this point hundreds of national languages will fuse into zonal languages "and subsequently the zonal languages will fuse into one common international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor

⁷*Ibid.*, XI, 348-9.

English, but a new language which has absorbed the best elements of the national and zonal languages."⁸

It would seem that the limits of this inquiry had been reached, as this view offers no prospect of further identifying this future world language. Continued probing would be pointless if, in fact, the Soviet leadership considered all the existing major languages on a par, as being equally eligible to shape the form of this future common world tongue. But closer examination shows that this is clearly not the case. In the struggle for world supremacy between East and West the roles of Russian and English are cast in entirely different lights.

The Soviet regime claims that "American colonizers, aspiring to world domination, are seeking to have English recognized as the world language which should replace all other languages." Accordingly, the American motto "E Pluribus Unum" means "from the separate sovereign states to a single world government, with English as the single world language."⁹ To facilitate this conquest "American linguists are hastily preparing plans for the 'simplification' of the English language in order to make it the single international tongue." These efforts are producing "the poisonous bacteria of cosmopolitanism" intended to "destroy a feeling of national dignity in the soul," and thereby aid the capitulation of nations to the "American imperialists."¹⁰ But such strivings will be of no avail, since an attempt "to force the English language upon all peoples" is sure to meet with "utter failure and defeat."¹¹

The prospect for Russian is depicted in precisely the opposite manner. Russian is credited with a constant accretion of strength through its supposedly voluntary adoption by an ever-mounting number of non-Russian peoples. This process began in the multilingual Soviet Union and has spread to large areas outside the Soviet Union.

During the 1920's attempts to force the adoption of Russian among non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R. were officially condemned out of consideration for the newly aroused sensitivities of

⁸Stalin, "Otvet Tovarishch A. Kholopovy," July 28, 1950, *Marksizm i voprosyazykoznaniiia* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 45-7 (italics, Stalin's).

⁹T. P. Lomtev, "I. V. Stalin o razvitiï natsionalnykh yazykov v epokhu sotsializma," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2 (1949), pp. 136-7.

¹⁰A. Yelistratova, "Izmenniki naroda," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 2, 1949, p.2.

¹¹M. Kammar, "An Outstanding Contribution to the Science of Marxism," *New Times*, No. 26, June 27, 1951, p. 7.

the non-Russian nationalities. But even this earliest period was marked by relapses into Russification. For example, from 1920 until August, 1923, the Soviet government sanctioned the application in the Ukraine of Lebed's so-called "theory of the struggle of two cultures." In the Ukraine Russian was widely spoken in the cities, while Ukrainian was the language of the countryside. Under the cover of proposing a natural struggle between them, this theory was really intended to produce the victory of Russian over Ukrainian, on the grounds that the future belonged to the Russian-speaking urban proletariat which possessed a culture superior to the backward-looking, Ukrainian-speaking peasantry.

The rediscovery of the various national languages in the Soviet Union came as a mixed blessing to these national minorities, since it often had the curious effect of elevating the importance of Russian among the non-Russian peoples. Instead of creating a common language for ethnically-related peoples who were hitherto largely illiterate, Soviet policy elevated dialects into languages, even, if need be, at the cost of inventing new, written alphabets. This conscious policy of fragmentation might be explained, in large part, by the fear that large, cohesive blocs of non-Russians, speaking a common tongue, would present a formidable threat to the centralized, Russian-based dictatorship. The treatment of the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Union provides the clearest illustration of this policy of parcelization. In an effort to avoid the creation of a large Moslem state in the Volga-Urals region, the Soviet regime created separate Bashkir and Tatar A.S.S.R.'s, and enlarged upon the somewhat artificial distinction between the Bashkir and Tatar languages. Moreover, it was forbidden to write these languages in the Arabic script, since this would have encouraged Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ties, which were far more deadly sins than a tie between the Bashkirs and the Tatars. This pattern of linguistic development was later repeated among the numerous peoples of Turkic stock in Central Asia and in the Northern Caucasus. While non-Russian languages were discovered by the score, their development was carefully channelled and their divergencies inflated so that no new, regional non-Russian language could evolve among them. The logical result of this policy was that Russian increasingly became the *lingua franca* of these non-Russian peoples.

Stalin expressed opposition to Russian as an official state language for the last time in 1930. Those who urged its adoption were still condemned as Great Russian chauvinists. But the trend towards

Great Russian chauvinism was, in fact, well under way. The tempo of introducing the study of Russian among non-Russian peoples was increasingly stepped up during the 1930's, and on March 13, 1938 the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union jointly decreed the obligatory teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools.¹²

The latter half of the 1930's also marked the switch-over from the use of the Latin to the Cyrillic (or Russian) alphabet for the languages of numerous non-Russian peoples. During the 1920's the Latin script was introduced on the theory, most acutely expressed by Trotsky, that Western Europe and not Russia would be the heart of the Soviet World State. It was assumed that the future world language would be based upon Western European, rather than Russian, roots. Furthermore, the adoption of the Latin, instead of the Cyrillic script within the Soviet Union, avoided the odious connotation of Great Russian chauvinism, an attitude which was still officially condemned during this early period.

Stalin's counterattack in the linguistic field was delayed until the middle 1930's. As late as 1933 a Soviet source reported that "72 nationalities of the U.S.S.R., formerly without alphabets, had received them, of which 64 were based on the Latin script."¹³ Many more languages previously written in another script, for example in Arabic, had also been Latinized. Within a decade virtually a complete transformation occurred in all these languages. Only a few peoples who had for centuries maintained a vigorous literary language in a non-Cyrillic script (the Georgians, Armenians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians) were left untouched. Yiddish was also unaffected, but the Yiddish press in the Soviet Union was almost completely closed down by 1949. All the remaining non-Russian languages in the Soviet Union went through a second painful metamorphosis, this time as part of an undisguised program of Russification. The Soviet leaders frankly stated that the purpose of forcing these non-Russian peoples to adopt the Cyrillic script was to

¹²A. M. Danev, ed., *Narodnoe obrazovanie: osnovnye postanovleniya, prikazy i instrukstii* (Moscow, 1948), p. 86. Isolated Union Republics, such as the Ukraine and Belorussia, made the teaching of Russian compulsory before this. In the Ukraine, for example, Russian was obligatory as early as 1923: see Harold R. Weinstein, "Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine," *The Slavonic Year-Book, American Series*, I (1941), 144-8.

¹³L. Slavin and T. Khodzhaev, "Natsionalnye raiony na rubezhe dvukh piatiletok," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 3 (March 1934), pp. 177-8.

accelerate their learning of Russian and broaden the influence of Russian culture. The Soviet press abounded in expressions of gratitude for the "service" which this second alphabet reform had rendered. Thus a group of Kirgiz declared: "The adoption of a new alphabet based on the Russian script has played a tremendous role in elevating the culture of the Kirgiz people by bringing them into closer association with the Great Russian culture."¹⁴

The Estonian philologist, Alo Raun, summarized the impact of this linguistic Russification. "Examining any one of the languages of the Soviet Union, e.g., Mordvinian, one is shocked by the discovery that it swarms with Russian words, and that often only the suffixes are Mordvinian. The word order, use of cases, etc., are a poor imitation of Russian."¹⁵

Soviet authorities, far from objecting to this characterization of their policy, only found fault with those who obstructed its implementation. A long article in *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1949 complained of resistance from "local bourgeois nationalists," who were accused of "masquerading as defenders of their national language." Their treachery "consisted first of all, in attempts to eliminate international and particularly sociopolitical terminology, and to replace it by a provincial, nationalist terminology." That is, the non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union were required to use international terms of foreign origin in the form in which they have been adopted in the Russian language. Secondly, these bourgeois nationalists

sought to use foreign languages as their models, persistently trying to minimize the importance of the Russian language. Belorussian and Ukrainian nationalists injected their native speech with elements of the Polish gentry's speech; the Moldavian nationalists tried to drag into their language aristocratic Rumanian drawing-room words; and the Latvian nationalists, carrying out the orders of the German gentry, attempted to Germanize their tongue. The bourgeois nationalists of our Eastern Republics injected their native languages with Persian-Arabic and Turkish elements. In essence, this was a policy of betrayal of national interests, a policy of cosmopolitanism.

Only by using the Russian language as their model could these non-Russians defend their "national interests." Russian, of course, had no objectionable history, since it had never been the language

¹⁴"Velikomu vozdu sovetskogo naroda I. V. Stalinu, ot Kirgizskogo naroda," *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 2.

¹⁵Alo Raun, "National in Form, Socialistic in Content," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, VI, No. 2 (Spring, 1950), 115-6. See also Ilarion Ohienko, "Ukrainian Literary Language in the U.S.S.R.," *ibid.*, VI, No. 3 (Summer 1950), 229-40.

of the Tsars and the Russian gentry who gathered in their drawing rooms to plot the forcible Russification of the Belorussian, Ukrainian, Polish, and other languages! And how could one resist the obvious logic of the assumption that Russian was the natural model for the languages of the peoples of Central Asia rather than Persian, Arabic, or Turkish! A third and final accusation rested on the charge that "bourgeois nationalists artificially bred local words and forms to obstruct the penetration of Russian words and forms."¹⁶ Again, was it not obvious that the use of local words and forms in a non-Russian language was "artificial," while the use of Russian words and forms was "natural"? In contrast to the petty, narrow-minded mentality nourished by the non-Russian languages, Russian was portrayed in the following manner:

The Great Russian language has become the source of enrichment and flowering for the different national languages. . . . The Russian language is great, rich and mighty. It is the instrument of the most advanced culture in the world. From its inexhaustible treasures, the national languages of the U.S.S.R. draw a life-giving elixir. . . .¹⁷

This Soviet conception of the role of Russian, both within the U.S.S.R., and in the development of a world language, found its theoretical justification by means of a distorted interpretation of the works of Nicolai Ya. Marr, the father of Soviet linguistics. Marr died in 1934, leaving a collection of linguistic theories, many of which rested upon arbitrary assumptions lacking proof or consistency. In broad outline, Marr postulated the operation of a single world glottogonic, or language-forming process. Though all languages are related, they are divided into four classes, representing four chronological strata, or stages of development. Those languages which somehow got stuck at a lower level are without a future, while those in the fourth stage of development represent the material for a future world language. Russian was placed in this highest stage along with all Indo-European languages. Marr considered language as an element in the Marxist superstructure, dependent upon the economic base of society. Consequently, the creation of a single world socialist economy was expected to produce a single world language. Just as this base might be changed by force, so Marr thought the linguistic superstructure should be impelled to develop towards its ultimate goal.

¹⁶Lomtev, "I. V. Stalin," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2 (1949), p. 135.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 136.

"Mankind, proceeding towards economic unity and a classless society, cannot help applying artificial means, scientifically worked out, in order to accelerate this broad process."¹⁸

Marr considered himself a strict Marxist who put class above nation. He was interested in the evolution of a future proletarian world language, rather than in the aggrandizement of any single national language, Russian included. But the elements of Marr's theories, and the vagueness with which they were stated lent themselves to easy perversion by subsequent Soviet linguists, who began a systematic glorification of the Russian language, in the guise of Marr's linguistic theories. We have already indicated the application of "artificial means" to favor the victory of Russian in the Soviet Union, where Russian was clearly considered the language of a chosen people who would assume the directing role in the future socialist world society. From this it was an easy step to assert that Russian would likewise be the future world language. This conclusion was explicitly drawn by a Soviet writer in January, 1949. It was held that "one world language has replaced another time and again throughout the thousands of years of the history of mankind," with the economic base of each era raising a different language to world supremacy.

Latin was the language of the ancient world and the early middle ages. French became the language of the ruling classes in the feudal era. It was maintained for a long time together with feudal traditions and customs, and became the language of international diplomacy. English became the world language of capitalism. . . . Looking to the future we see that the Russian language is the world language of socialism.¹⁹

This simple, schematic view appeared to have been upset by Stalin's abrupt intervention in the Soviet linguistics discussion in the summer of 1950. Stalin unceremoniously provided Marr with a second funeral—this time, an ideological burial. Suddenly Soviet philologists "discovered" that the basis of their entire linguistic work had been unscientific. What caused this disavowal of Marr, and what effect did this have both upon the Soviet concept of a world language, and upon the role of Russian in the development of this world language?

The denunciation of Marr was explained first of all, on the grounds

¹⁸Cited in A. Chikobava, "O nekotorykh voprosakh sovetskogo yazykoznaniiia," *Pravda*, May 9, 1950, p. 3.

¹⁹D. Zaslavsky, "Velikii yazyk nashei epokhi," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Jan. 1, 1949, p. 3.

that his theories had introduced such chaos into Soviet linguistics that most serious linguistic work had been brought to a standstill. No doubt there was considerable justification in this complaint. These newly-found critics of Marr's followers charged that the literacy of the non-Russian peoples had unmistakably suffered as a result of the crude attempts to Russify the non-Russian languages.

N. Ya. Marr's followers completely ignored the specific features of national languages and, in an oversimplified and vulgarized manner, interpreted the leading role of the Russian language in the development of national languages as a mechanical hybridization of the two. The practical results of such a vulgarized approach to the development of national languages was the discarding from some alphabets of a number of letters which reflected phonetic peculiarities of the national languages. . . . This harmful approach, involving a break with the existing laws of the national languages, led to anarchy in orthography, to innumerable difficulties in mastery of the grammar of the native language, in the work of local newspapers and magazines, etc.²⁰

But the damage was not confined to non-Russian languages, since these methods had also led to an estrangement of these languages from Russian. "The 'drawing together' of languages, recommended by the followers of N. Ya. Marr, actually only hampers their real harmonizing Destroying historically developed rules of pronunciation does not make it easier, but harder for the working people to master new words borrowed from Russian, i.e., yields results contrary to the aims proclaimed by the supporters of the 'new teaching' on language."²¹ These critics did not object to the principle of altering these non-Russian languages so as to draw them closer to Russian, but only to the use of harsh and clumsy methods which had, in fact, obstructed the attainment of this goal. This sudden abuse of Marr was a tactical concession to the development of non-Russian languages, but it was by no means clear-cut defeat for the Russian language. Subsequent comments made it clear that Russian was not expected to lose its dominant position, nor was the idea of its eventual victory disowned. These goals would be pursued, but with more caution and by more skillful means.

The arbitrary interference with the non-Russian languages had proceeded from the assumption that language was part of the superstructure and therefore subject to artificial manipulation. Stalin now attacked this practice by denying the premise that language

²⁰A. E. Mordinov, "Orazvitii yazykov sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 3 (1950), p. 82.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 83.

was part of the superstructure, or for that matter, that language was even a class phenomenon. This "revelation" had long been a commonplace assumption among those who did not pretend to understand the mysteries of dialectical materialism, but for good Marxists this came as a blow. Language, Stalin announced

was created not by any class, but by all society, by all classes of society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. . . . Language is the product of a whole series of epochs, in the course of which it takes shape, is enriched, develops, and is polished. A language therefore exists immeasurably longer than any base or any superstructure.

Stalin said that Pushkin's language "has been preserved in all essentials as the basis of modern Russian," and that "the Russian language has remained essentially what it was before the October Revolution."²² Stalin belatedly did for language what he had previously done for the teaching of history, namely: assert the interests of nation above class. Far from destroying the prestige of the Russian language, he was fortifying it by drawing upon the endless stream of historical memories and traditions of Russian nationalism.

There were doubtless other unspoken reasons for the renunciation of Marr's theories. Not only did their distorted application provoke an unprofitable resistance among the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union, but they also served to insult many nations outside the U.S.S.R. In Marr's four stages of linguistic development, for example, Chinese was permanently frozen at the lowest level. The embarrassment which this held for Soviet relations with Red China is obvious.

Moreover, Marr's repudiation of comparative philology contradicted the development of Pan-Slavic studies in the East European satellite states of Slavic origin, thus hindering their Russification.

What effect did the discrediting of Marr's theories have upon the Soviet concept of a world language? Chikobava, developing the newly accepted position, noted that "Marr expressed himself in favor of a single common language for future mankind. This is the only matter of principle on which, it would seem, Academician N. Ya. Marr's views are in accord with the theses of Marxism-Leninism." The prospect of a single world language was still upheld, but the "dying away of national languages and the formation of a

²²Stalin, "Otnositelno Marksizma v yazykoznanii," *Marksizm i voprosy*, pp. 4-7.

single common world language will take place gradually, without any 'artificial means' invoked to 'accelerate' this process."²³

This ban on "artificial means," it should be recalled, applies solely to the period *after* the creation of the Soviet World State. Prior to that time Stalin predicted that national languages would engage in a mortal struggle in which "one of the languages usually comes out the victor, whereas the other dies away. . . ."²⁴ "Such was the case, for instance, with the Russian language, with which the languages of a number of other peoples mixed in the course of historical development, and which always emerged the victor." The effect which this struggle had upon the Russian language was to enlarge its vocabulary, "but this not only did not weaken, but on the contrary enriched and strengthened the Russian language."²⁵ Stalin gave no indication that Russian would not continue to emerge the victor in future struggles which are predicted up until the very moment of the creation of the Soviet World State.

The Soviet theorists have already clearly nominated Russian as a zonal language with unlimited prospects of expansion. "In the formation of a zonal language common to many nations, Russian will undoubtedly play the decisive role of many socialist nations. With the appearance of new socialist nations the world-historic role and influence of the Russian language will steadily increase."²⁶ This view, expressed in 1949, does not seem to have been repudiated in the linguistics discussion of 1950. Following this discussion the importance of Russian was affirmed both within and beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

The role of the Russian language in the development of the languages and cultures of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. constantly increases. . . . Russian has therefore become an *international language* for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. But the significance of the Russian language is not limited to this. The Great Russian language is becoming a second native language for the liberated peoples of the countries of the New Democracies as well as for the Chinese People's Republic. . . .

In our time the Russian language is becoming the most popular and widespread language in the world. The process of steady growth of the world significance of the Russian language reflects the vanguard role of our country . . . in the struggle for the liberation of all mankind from the yoke of exploitation and oppression.²⁷

²³Chikobava, "Onekotorykh . . ." *Pravda*, May 9, 1950, p. 3.

²⁴Stalin, "Otvet Tovarishchu . . ." *Marksizm i voprosy*, pp. 45-7.

²⁵Stalin, "Otnositelno Marksizma," *ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁶Lomtev, "I. V. Stalin," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2 (1949), p. 140.

²⁷Mordinov, "Orazvitiu . . ." *ibid.*, No. 3 (1950), p. 91.

The satellite states duly echoed this glorification of Russian. The Czechoslovak press supported the demand of "giving the Russian language the same rights as our own Czech and Slovak languages. . . . It is for us the world language . . . the language of world-wide brotherhood."²⁸ And Chervenkov, the Premier of Bulgaria, hailed Russian as the language of "the richest and most outstanding culture in the whole world. This imbues the Russian language with a world-historic significance and makes a knowledge of it vital to every advanced fighter for the happiness of his people."²⁹ This bowing and scraping by provincial satraps before the mother tongue of Moscow is a meaningful part of a larger design, for Stalin was quite aware of the importance of a single language in the process of building a world empire. He specifically noted that "the empires of Cyrus or Alexander the Great or of Caesar and Charles the Great . . . were transitory and unstable military and administrative unions. These empires not only did not have, but they could not have a single language common to the whole empire and understood by all members of the empire."³⁰

It would seem that there is a fundamental contradiction in Stalin's position on a world language. On the one hand, Stalin declared that the ultimate world language will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but something new. On the other hand, Russian has been accorded a favored and privileged position denied to all other major languages. The Soviet leadership has already designated Russian, but *only* Russian, as one of the world's zonal languages. Some of the offensive, chauvinistic overtones of the campaign to force the adoption of Russian by non-Russian peoples may have been eliminated by the benign assurance that the ultimate world language will not be Russian. But along with this goes the expectation that Russian will continually fight and conquer as many non-Russian languages as possible during the period before the victory of the Soviet World State. Theoretically, Russian is only supposed to enter into open combat with other languages in the arena of national oppression and inequality, that is, in the non-Soviet world. Within the Soviet world, where, by definition, national harmony

²⁸"What the Russian Language Meant and Means to Us," *Slovánsky príhled*, No. 7/8 (1949); cited in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*, II, No. 10 (Oct. 1953), 41.

²⁹"Vsemirno-istoricheskoe znachenie Russkogo jazyka," *Pravda*, Oct. 1, 1952, p. 4.

³⁰Stalin, "Otnositelno Marksizma," *Marksizm i voprosy*, p. 10.

reigns supreme, the struggle for the domination of one language over others has been replaced by the mutual enrichment of one language by another. Yet it is evident that this "mutual enrichment" has been largely a one-way proposition in which Russian has been elevated, consciously and conspicuously, above all other languages.

This encouragement of the victory of Russian both within and beyond the confines of the Soviet world has definite implications for a future world language. If Russian gains a constant series of victories over non-Russian languages in the process of subduing non-Soviet nations to Soviet rule, then at the moment of the creation of the Soviet World State, Russian will have reached an almost impregnable position of universal supremacy. Nor should this position diminish after the Soviet World State has come into operation. The "mutual confidence" and "national equality" among nations, such as is claimed for the present Soviet world, will then have reached a universal scope. Behind a smoke screen of verbiage about the "mutual enrichment" of languages, Russian will then be given the opportunity to triumph on a world scale.

Since the fate of national languages is intimately connected with the ultimate fate of nations, this would mean that the world would become the Russian nation writ large. Lenin predicted the assimilation of nations under the world rule of socialism, but Stalin developed this into the prospect of the assimilation of all nations by the Russian nation ruling a Soviet World State.

The Career Woman in the Soviet Novel*

BY XENIA GASIOROWSKA

THE art of the Soviet writer, the appointed educator of the masses, extols certain values which are alleged to be exclusively Soviet. It is an art of creating a specific moral and social climate.

Socialist realism, the officially established method of Soviet creative art, provides a uniform blueprint for works of fiction. The characters are average, working Soviet men and women; the setting is the place where they work; the plot tells the story of their everyday life and work, both of which are dedicated to the task of "building socialism."

The subject matter of Soviet fiction and, it is assumed, the fabric of Soviet life, is work. The kind of work for which a fictional character is qualified determines his social status; the efficiency of his performance, his standard of living; its quality, his personal value. Apart from being an economic necessity, it is the one available outlet for personal ambition, and the only possible medium for romantic dreams of achievement. It is also a form of equality, since everybody must—and must desire to—work. There is no such thing as a life of complete leisure, at least not a life of *respectable* leisure. In order to qualify as an honest, worthy person, everybody, man and woman, must have the urge to be useful, and this is a point of importance for a writer.

"Our work," says a representative hero, "is everything. In it is the Truth and the Glory and all our joys. Work is a cure for all misfortunes."

Thus the problems of Soviet fictional characters arise and are solved through their work.

Within this frame of reference, more rigid than were the ancient unities, certain patterns have developed: patterns of environment, characterization, plot, dramatic situation, and emotional problems.

The environment featured in literature is usually a factory or a *kolkhoz* where a group or, to use a term more descriptive of the

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Soviet social climate, a collective, is engaged in its work. Variations, which reflect current political exigencies, may be universities, hospitals and, probably in connection with the post-Stalin policy of raising the general standard of living, dwelling construction projects and even large grocery stores.

The plot pattern shows the efforts of a "positive" character to perform his duties efficiently. His goal, however, is not personal success but that of an entire collective. His efforts are obstructed by negative characters, and the ensuing struggle serves to develop the action. This pattern is known as the conflict between the forces of the progressive New and those of the reactionary Old. It invariably ends in the victory of the New or positive element.

Characters fall into three patterns: workers, the acknowledged aristocracy of Soviet fiction; peasants, admitted in 1934 as full-fledged citizens after the liquidation of the kulaks; and the new Soviet-educated intelligentsia, a recent postwar element. Currently it is the intelligentsia that seems to furnish the most eligible fictional characters. Freed from the old stigma of bourgeois descent and education, they enjoy the prestige not only of worldly learning but also of what might be termed theological erudition in Marxist dogma. Their position is comparable to that of learned monks in mediaeval society. It is from the intelligentsia that new hero types have recently come into the monotonous world of Soviet fiction. One of them is the career woman.

In postwar Soviet literature this new type of heroine has become increasingly popular. Young, usually attractive though never a dazzling beauty, she is introduced by a favorite plot pattern as having just received her degree and been assigned to her first job. She has taken leave of her friends and fellow students, of her family, perhaps of a young man. The story begins with her reporting to the authorities at the place of her employment and to the administrative authorities of the district. Should she find it necessary to improve something—and she will because she represents the New—she should appeal to the district authorities; her chief being just another employee like herself, may err, while the members of the district administration represent the Party and the Government. She will be assigned a place to live in, usually a room in some apartment. She will meet her fellow workers, assume her duties and become part of the collective and the community. And the burden of the novel will be how this young Soviet professional woman takes her place in life and in society as another "builder of socialism."

The factor determining the life of the heroine is her work with its technical problems and her own performance. She lives wherever her job takes her, earns her living, achieves a good professional standing or fails to do so. She makes friends and enemies on her job, has competitors in her special field, must make decisions, accept responsibility for them, use her sense and not her sensibilities, her brains and not her emotions. In short, she works and lives exactly as a man does. The effect of this on the Soviet novel is immense, since it disturbs the accustomed psychological pattern. In non-Soviet fiction the romance at the core of the dramatic situation may affect the hero deeply, but he still has other interests in life whereas the heroine has none. Charles Bovary has his patients and the necessity of earning a living, but what does Emma have to fill her life apart from her quest for love? Levin has the management of his estate and his anxious doubts about God and Immortality; Karenin, his political career; Vronsky, his beau monde, but what have Kitty or Anna to occupy their time and their thoughts except their men and, to a degree, their children? What was Gretchen to Faust, Ophelia to Hamlet, Penelope to Ulysses compared to what their lovers were to these women? A story in which a young woman has other important problems than those created by love would have been a novelty in world fiction even without the added Soviet "novelty" of educational aims and rigid patterns imposed by socialist realism.

The standards set by Soviet writers for such women characters are unusually high, befitting a Joan of Arc, a Florence Nightingale, a Saint Clara of Assisi. And yet writers never fail to stress that these are the "legitimate heroines of Soviet literature, average working women." They can derive no spectacular income from their professional toil since they are in government service, may accept no fees from their grateful patients. Even a promotion to a higher position usually means little more than increased effort and greater responsibilities. In any case it is evidently assumed that Virtue, rewarded, ceases to be a virtue. All a heroine may expect in recognition of her performance above and beyond the call of duty is her picture in the papers, a citation from the government, perhaps even a decoration. This quasi-military nature of a civilian's professional career seems to be intentional: man or woman, a model citizen is a fighter on the front of socialist construction.

Thus, the heroine, liberated from worldly ambitions, concentrates on the lofty goal of duty well done. The purely physical effort

demanded from her is tremendous, and writers take great pains to describe it in detail. The dramatic effect is enhanced by her youth, slenderness, lack of experience. Obstacles in her path are various and many but she accepts them as a challenge. Some of these obstacles are normal in her profession, such as complicated cases of illness if she is a physician, machinery trouble if she is an engineer. Some are peculiar to Soviet conditions: travelling long miles over muddy or frozen roads, stormy rivers, or open country by reindeer, horseback, sometimes on foot. As a doctor, she is rushed from modern hospitals to snow-bound villages to deliver babies in filthy Yakut huts, to fight small-pox (Valentina, in A. Koptiaeva's *Comrade Anna*, 1949). As an engineer, she spends days and nights in tense, exhausting work improving the ship-building technique in the spirit of the current Five-Year Plan (Zina, in V. Kochetov's *The Zhurbin Family*, 1952). If an accident is traced to her negligence or even a plain mistake, she faces court action and possibly a few years in a labor camp (Nina, in A. Smirnov's *Engineer Nesterova*, 1947). As a meteorologist, she spends stormy nights alone at island weather stations (Arinka, in Iu. Pomozov's *On the Tsimlan Sea*, 1953). As a manager of a Siberian gold mine, she handles accidents and hunger strikes (Natal'ia in V. Ganibesov's *Prospectors*, 1948). As a geologist, she flies over the wild *taiga* drawing maps from airplanes and is injured in an air-crash (Marina, in A. Livnev's *Explorers*, 1950). As a geodesist, she is caught in a flood and salvages her instruments at the risk of her life (Zoia, in V. Starikov's *The Wind*, 1954). Surely, hers is the strength of ten, but then it is because her heart is pure. She is virtuous, modest, respects her elders—particularly the *partorgs*¹—does not smoke, drink, or flirt. First and foremost she is completely unselfish; she lives for others, gives all of herself to her work and in so doing finds herself: a humble but important particle in the gigantic whole.

Such women, it is evidently felt, need some explaining, and the explanation is readily given through the medium of characters as well as by literary critics:

Only in the pure, luminous atmosphere of victorious socialism grow—as a mass phenomenon—such remarkable . . . women, wise and courageous, proud . . . honest . . . and, most of all, dedicated to the cause of Communism and the Party. They are not moved by desire of fame, by petty vanity, but by a powerful urge to be of the greatest possible use to their country.

¹Local Party organizers.

And a lover muses:

She grew up in an excellent family. Her father is a well-known steelworker, her brother was posthumously awarded the Red Star for heroism. She attended one of the best Siberian schools, received her practical training in one of the best *kolkhozes*. She never saw human meanness, lived among excellent people, faced lots of difficulties . . . naturally the result was a character like hers.

And a heroine says: "I know that I must live my life doing what is right. How else can I live? I was born under the Soviet regime, I was educated in a Soviet school, my mind matured in a Soviet university."

Love, naturally, is not excluded from her life but she will not bestow it on an unworthy man. Unless he is a worker useful to society and capable of cherishing her social worth, too, he is disqualified by Soviet standards. In Soviet fiction broken engagements and unhappy marriages are not based on jealousy or unfaithfulness; Soviet people are allegedly free from such frailties.

The husband of Liuba, the schoolteacher, in G. Konovalov's *The Kolkhoz "Stepnoi Maiak"* (1949) "never spoke to her of anything outside the details of their home life; he admired her figure, her eyes, but never showed any interest in her work, her thoughts. Once he said to her: 'Give up that school, you are a married woman now.'" So Liuba left her husband for a better man; so did Lena in I. Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* (1954); likewise, in A. Koptiaeva's *Ivan Ivanovich* (1949), did Olga, wife of an otherwise excellent doctor who, engrossed in his practice, failed to recognize her legitimate longing for self-expression in journalism and discouraged her first efforts.

Such tragedies, if we can call them that inasmuch as the heroine's second choice is invariably a happy one, are rare. Socialist realism puts a strong stress on literature's duty to be optimistic. The path of love, both Young and Married, is usually smooth, the conflict in the novel being based, as was already mentioned, on professional difficulties resulting from the Marxist struggle between the Old and the New in society. Generally, the husband or lover is understanding and cooperative. Without murmur he subordinates his rendezvous to his partner's emergency overtime work. He accepts an untidy home, poor food, long periods of separation. He shares the anxieties and hardships of his mate's job, sympathizes with her physical fatigue and with troubles caused in her career by villains.

A few examples may help to establish the pattern of a story whose central character is a young career woman.

Xenia (in E. Sheremeteva's *On a Distant River*, 1953), a pediatrician, gives up graduate work in Moscow to join her fiancé Boris, a geologist in a small Siberian town. They plan on marrying at once, but he has to leave for field work in the *taiga*. Meanwhile she begins work in the hospital, discovers some unsatisfactory conditions, fights them, wins everybody's sympathy, and controls an outbreak of scarlet fever in a distant village. While working there she learns of an opportunity for Boris and herself to transfer to jobs where they need not be separated. However, in the midst of her tense work "there is no time to think about personal matters." When the epidemic is over, she decides that she has no right to desert the district with 4,000 children since no other pediatrician is available. Eventually, the Party authorities decide to leave them both on their separate jobs, and she is promised a citation for her good performance. Apparently, this constitutes a proper Soviet happy ending.

Valia (in Iu. Bondarev's *Engineers*, 1953) is just as enthusiastic about her work but less fortunate in her mate. Her husband, a colleague working in the same laboratory, is envious of her efficiency, unsympathetic with her professional problems and resentful of her being too engrossed in them to attend properly to her household duties. Estrangement follows, but Valia's final triumph over her laboratory difficulties wins professional recognition for her and, possibly, marital bliss since her husband now recognizes her value.

Nina (in S. Antonov's *Her First Job*, 1952), a safety technique engineer, begins her career on a big construction project. Certain conditions being unsatisfactory, Nina wrestles with them and so antagonizes her director and workers, particularly one reckless and stubborn young man. By the time she succeeds in improving safety conditions she realizes that she likes the stubborn young worker very well indeed, but finds out that he is engaged to a pretty brick-layer. At this psychological moment she is offered a chance to transfer to a less harassing job, but she refuses it. Thus, she seeks to cure her heartache through the challenge of effort and responsibility.

Irina (in E. Sheremeteva's *The Housing Project "Pobeda,"* 1950) is an architect. Her project for the construction of a model settlement is rejected in competition. Disappointed, she also suffers because her husband is too busy to offer her any comfort. Her successful competitor, engaged elsewhere, asks her to supervise the construction according to his plan. Irina, suppressing her resent-

ment, accepts, then realizes that the colleague's project was really better than hers. Thereupon she finds happiness in her work, and now that she is as busy as her husband, their misunderstanding is over.

Nastia (in G. Nikolaeva's *A Story about a Director of MTS² and its Chief Agronomist*, 1954) is the agronomist mentioned in the title, fresh from school and naively enthusiastic. She finds certain conditions in the MTS unsatisfactory, namely, that not enough attention is paid to poorer *kolkhozes* while more successful ones get preferential treatment. Nastia protests, thus antagonizing the local authorities. She fights against them stubbornly, and in the end makes her opponents realize that she is the one who understands the Party's concern for the people's welfare. Concurrently she wins the love of one of her former opponents who now recognizes and rejoices in her moral superiority.

It will be noticed that romance is not altogether absent from any of these stories, but romance is not their topic. The plot is not based on love; love does not pose the main problem for the heroine nor does it determine her decision. At the center of the drama is her performance within her profession, which qualifies her as a positive character. The same standard measures both the value of her mate and her own value in choosing him.

The psychological pattern of a Soviet work of fiction cannot help but strike the Western reader as implausible. It does not necessarily make the same impression on the Soviet reading public, however. Soviet society, isolated as it is from other cultures, conditioned from the cradle to the grave by an incessant "educational" onslaught through books, press, radio, screen, stage and school at all levels, cannot altogether reject the ideological values thus promoted. Once they have been established, these values must in turn begin to exercise certain pressures: social, since nobody likes being different from everybody else; moral, since everybody avoids the type of behavior which is so consistently denounced.

It is all too easy to dismiss as ridiculous the now familiar tragedy of a Soviet heroine whose lover proved to be a poor worker in his factory, *kolkhoz*, or office. Yet, unless she loves him only for his good looks or high earnings—which presumably can happen in any society but is approved by none—her feeling must also include respect for and appreciation of qualities which her milieu recognizes

²Machine Tractor Station.

as valuable. And basic values as constituted by the Party for the people of the Soviet Union are held to be hard work for the welfare of the Soviet State and efficient performance of individual duty.

Could a medieval woman fall in love with an atheist, a Victorian lady with a man of loose morals, or any heroine at any time with a traitor? A good woman in Soviet fiction can hardly fall in love with a saboteur, a loafer, a man "bearing the marks of bourgeois vices." He is alien to her moral and psychological climate.

Should, nevertheless, such a misfortune happen, then she must show her moral superiority by trying to reform the man as all classical heroines did before her. If she fails, she must renounce him and suffer.

Unless a man is cast as a villain, he is sure to match the heroine's excellence, virtue for virtue. He, too, will apply to her the Soviet measure of high performance and social usefulness. A passage from a novel is illustrative. Two delegates have met at a dance at an all-Union *komsomol* convention. The girl tells the youth that she is glad to meet him because they are, in a way, acquainted: she works at the factory that makes lamps for the mine where he is employed. Isn't he glad, too? "No reason for joy," is his answer, "they are poor lamps. Improve the quality of your production and then I'll be happy to know you better."

It is interesting to note that besides these new, allegedly specific Soviet values, old-fashioned morals are very much acceptable in Soviet fiction today. Girls are chaste, and men respect their chastity; there are very few naughty girls in post-war literature, still fewer seduced girls. Seducers rate as the worst type of villains. Marital faith and love are the rule; in fact, they are claimed to be purely Soviet inventions. Babies, invariably blond and fat, abound. Sincerity, modesty, gentleness, politeness, humane kindness—all these are attributes that a Soviet citizen must aspire to, which a Communist should possess and a *partorg* does possess. Sir Galahad properly instructed in Marxism would make a very acceptable *partorg*.

The universality of this high standard of morals is significant. It contributes to the much advertised claim of equality of both sexes under the regime. There are equalizing factors, furthermore, in the methods of character drawing. Glamor is not requisite for a career woman, but attractiveness is acceptable because it is part of her characterization as a perfect product of a classless society; perhaps for the same reason heroes are always handsome. Feminine charm is encouraged and small, innocent vanities such as perfume

are permitted, though manicure for some reason is reserved mostly for villainesses. Heroes, strong and virile, are given to buying new hats and ties. When presented as tired, grimy, bruised, disheveled lovers they are still beautiful in the eyes of their partners precisely because of these tokens of conscientious professional effort. A hero-husband inhales with relish the faint smell of antiseptics clinging to the clothes of his physician wife. A teacher fondly plans to make her fiancé, a Stakhanovite tractor driver, "change his socks regularly, shave, cut his hair and clip his fingernails." Soviet fiction, incidentally, offers many examples of educated girls marrying simple proletarians who, it must be said, are invariably working to acquire a higher education.

Economically, a career woman is completely independent and thus has, in Stalin's words, achieved the only true equality: that of the *trudoden*.³ Her education, career, civic duties, professional responsibilities, and rewards are similar in all respects to those of men. In short, in Soviet fiction, an *average* professional woman is absolutely equal to an *average* professional man.

When, however, a heroine of this type meets with a man of higher social usefulness than hers, his interests take precedence. The following examples are characteristic:

Nonna (in V. Panova's *The Factory "Kruzhilikh."*, 1950) is an able engineer, a first-class citizen in her own right until she becomes engaged to Listopad, the busy, efficient director of the factory where they are both employed. From then on she has no illusions as to the place she is going to occupy in their future marriage. In one episode when she is ill with pneumonia, he comes for a hasty goodbye, leaving for Moscow on important business.

It is going to be this way, always. He will never give up anything in the name of love; will make no concessions. Giving things up, making concessions, conciliating, waiting, will be for her alone . . . She took his big hand resting on her hair and kissed it.

Marina (in D. Granin's *The Seekers*, 1954) is an engineer too, a proud, self-willed beauty. But the work which Lobanov, her betrothed, is doing is so important that she does not resent his being hours late for a rendezvous. She realizes that after they are married

she is going to sit and wait for him, exactly as she is doing at this moment. And he will forget about her, engrossed in his work. He is tractable and gentle so long as things go well with his project, ready to comply with her wishes in

³The salary norm for a working day.

everything. But should she stand in his way he will pass over her like a tank. "Will I be happy"? [she asks herself] "Yes. Why? Because I want it to be like this. This is the most difficult and the most precious thing in life. Is it so difficult though, when you are in love?"

Obviously, it is not difficult when the object of love is an outstanding Soviet man.

And a critic explains what true Soviet love is:

Radiant and pure . . . born of common work. Not a fateful force descending as a blow at the will of mysterious elements, but a sunny, sensible feeling caused by a community of interests, community of efforts, a feeling whose source is not physical beauty alone but also superior moral qualities shown in the lovers' attitude towards Work and Fatherland.

Sweet femininity, social usefulness, and love seem to have become as one here. The heroine joyfully pursues her career a step behind her mate. As a woman she loves him, as a colleague she respects him, as a citizen she dutifully follows a superior builder of socialism.

Tolstoy's Motives for Writing "War and Peace"

BY RICHARD HARE

WHEN Tolstoy's story, *The Cossacks*, first appeared in print (1862), the radical monthly, *The Contemporary*, still an arbiter of "progressive" taste, pronounced that his career as an imaginative writer was obviously played out. It mockingly compared the story with those out-of-date Byronic moods and poses, in which the unhappy civilized hero hunts for oblivion and repose in some far-off primitive country, "where cliffs ride to the clouds and people are as free as eagles." It derided Count Tolstoy for having failed to move with the times and to recognize that states of mind, which seemed attractive and even appropriate in the romantic eighteen twenties, merely reeked of aristocratic anachronism in the sober, public-spirited eighteen sixties.

Tolstoy, however, had no intention of allowing himself to be buried alive so simply and so prematurely. He felt that he could refute the impudent and spiteful verdict of *The Contemporary* in two different ways; by writing a highly controversial topical novel, showing that his own attitude to the present was far more up-to-date and truly progressive than that of the radicals themselves (a course which both Turgenev and Pisemsky pursued with marked success), or by creating a new *tour-de-force* of historical fiction, which deliberately abandoned the sordid wrangles of the present day and found in the past a virgin sphere for pure and moving imaginative literature.

Of course Tolstoy readily conceded to the impetus of history and inescapable heredity a certain formative direction, which the radicals so noisily claimed to have first discovered. But his new historical work of art would show much more, for it would also prove that the radical historians had jumped to unwarranted and preposterous conclusions, which, if they passed unchallenged, would distort and stunt the mental growth of human society everywhere.

Tolstoy deplored the rapid output, in the eighteen sixties, of half-baked novels and stories, hastily flavored with some topical and popular *cause*, on the strength of which their authors thought that

they were absolved from the harder work of hammering out live characters and an enduring literary shape. Bearing these sketchy contemporary works in mind, he deliberately chose to write a historical novel as a far more ambitious and original venture. And he cast it in the period of the Napoleonic wars because that time came nearest to his own heart and understanding, and because in wealth of emotion, psychological strength and dramatic beauty, he knew that he could make it eclipse the more confused and petty wrangles of the present age.

Not that Tolstoy felt in any way drawn by the comfortable escapist lure of the kind of historical novel then popularized by Sir Walter Scott. On the contrary, he revolted emphatically against overworked poetic sentiments and the paraphernalia of mediaeval picturesqueness. He shunned the romantic vogue for stilted language and the long-winded glorification of sublime mountains and winding rivers. He preferred to call a spade a spade, even when it was a historical specimen. The period of the past which he chose was close enough to the present to be alive, and resembled it in being also racked by wars, political upheavals and institutional reforms. But he wanted to show that precisely these spectacular events, which professional historians had singled out for such elaborate study, were trivial, irrelevant and destructive, compared with the personal home and family life of the people who managed to survive and subdue all this outward turmoil, but about whom history had remained unjustifiably silent.

In this way *War and Peace*, although historical in setting, became a formal protest against that prevalent view of history, which isolated certain showy fragments of the past and treated them as if they formed an intelligible and important whole. Tolstoy accused the "chroniclers of historical glory," whether in war or politics, of seeing nothing beyond the ugly eruptions in human affairs and mistaking these eruptions for life itself. How could men know the normal pulse of history if they tested it only when it was in a feverish state?

We know that Tolstoy had already decided to compose a novel about the Napoleonic period in Russia when he wrote to his sister-in-law, Elizabeth Bers, in September 1863, and asked her to look up for him any revealing chronicles, diaries, or records which she could find in Moscow. She wrote back confirming his apprehension that there seemed to be almost no written records covering the Russian domestic background of that time, since the attention of

almost every educated person was then focussed on the Napoleonic wars. Tolstoy's early draft sketches of the novel reveal his deep concern to remedy these omissions, to observe the undercurrents of the historical stream, the more intimate springs of human action, which the blunter historians had hitherto ignored. Nor could he make this switch of emphasis thoroughly without also revising the current judgement of certain famous historical personalities, who had for long occupied the center of the stage.

"Were there not thousands of officers" he wrote, "killed in Alexander's wars, incomparably braver, more honest and virtuous than the voluptuous, cunning and false Field-Marshal Kutuzov? Could the union or non-union of the Papal states with Napoleon's French Empire in any way alter, increase or diminish the love for beauty felt by an artist who had just come to study art in Rome? . . . When an officer fell on the field of Borodino with a bullet through his chest, and knew that he was dying, do not imagine that he rejoiced about saving his fatherland, or the honor of Russian arms, or about the humiliation of Napoleon. On the contrary he thought about his mother, the woman he had loved, the joys and smallness of life; he reviewed his intimate beliefs and convictions. And Napoleon, Kutuzov, the Grand Army, the martial valor of Russians, all seemed to him pitiful and insignificant by comparison. . . . Neither Kutuzov nor the Emperor Alexander, nor Talleyrand will be my heroes. I shall write the history of people less restricted than government servants, independent people, living in conditions more propitious to the human struggle between good and evil, absolved from poverty and crass ignorance, but equally free from the shackles of power, and without those outstanding vices which seem to be indispensable in order to win a place in historical chronicles."¹

Here, in brief, is the underlying motive which first guided the creation of *War and Peace*; a determined effort to bring to light (without underestimating the fugitive but inchoate emotions of anonymous masses), the vital, unacknowledged part played by obscure individuals, whose private deeds and thoughts, although they had passed unrecorded, deserved to be remembered with more respect than the public activities of certain grotesquely overestimated statesmen and generals.

In this way Tolstoy removed from his pedestal the established national hero Field-Marshal Kutuzov, even though in the final

¹B. Eichenbaum, *Lev Tolstoy*. Leningrad, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 245.

version of *War and Peace* he relented somewhat, admitting in him a generous strain, and making his slow passivity and cunning appear more like a subtle, oriental wisdom. To counterbalance this de-bunking of public figures, Tolstoy discovered hitherto unsuspected qualities in the despised serf-owning landowners of the same period. He went out of his way to picture the veneration and esteem which his own peasants felt for the old Prince Bolkonsky. They liked his severity, tempered with a sense of justice. They even felt grateful to him, that he, the master whom they served with so much reverence, was "a prince, a general, a person entirely different from themselves, and never descending to their level."² "Much as I deplore upsetting the reader," Tolstoy wrote, "by something so contrary to most accepted versions of that time, I must warn him that Prince Bolkonsky was in no way a villain, flogged nobody, did not habitually gorge himself, or keep harems, never walled up his wives, and far from being devoted to nothing but whipping his serfs, hunting and dissipation, could not abide that sort of thing, and was a wise, decent, and cultured human being, of whom nobody would feel ashamed if he were introduced into a drawing-room to-day."³

This special pleading for Prince Bolkonsky also became much milder in the final version of the novel, where his strong will and hasty, uneven temper make him all the more convincing as a character, through being cast in a less heroic mould. Tolstoy went further when he elevated Kutuzov's slow, lazy temperament into a wise inertia. However, none of these modifications ran counter to Tolstoy's guiding motive, but tended rather to humanize the major figures by making them more irrational, thus bringing the historical epic back to a more even level with the personalities in the private family chronicle.

Tolstoy's determination to keep personal aims, beyond the sphere of any public concerns, from being distorted by the treacherous pathos of progressive and patriotic clichés, caused him at first to give the intimate chronicle pride of place over the epic. In doing this, however, he had to be on guard against emerging as the champion of trivial or self-centered people, whom he undoubtedly disliked as much as successful politicians, and never wished to justify. A pitiless severity governs his attitude alike to empty-headed frivolous little women like Prince Andrew's wife, to the luxurious prostitute

²Ibid., p. 247.

³Ibid., p. 245.

Hélène, and to the insipid though conventionally virtuous Sonia. For Tolstoy maintained throughout the novel that the only characters who can qualify for his full esteem are those who remain close enough to nature to be inwardly moved by it, but not in a sentimentally Rousseau-esque or brutal sense. Though the wild animal was always close to Tolstoy's heart, he saw the gulf which separated it from a human soul, and in the handsome philistine, Anatole Kuragin, he showed how the same brute strength, which was beautiful and legitimate in a wild beast, became base and disgusting in a human being.

As Tolstoy went further with the full articulation of his characters, the contrast (though it remained) between overrated public figures and undervalued private people, diminished in importance. Its place was taken by a more far-reaching contrast between intuitive and vital people like Natasha and Karataev (or Pierre, under Karataev's spell) and self-conscious, ambitious people such as Napoleon and Speransky. In the more complex characters, like Pierre Bezoukhov and Prince Andrew, intuitive moral instincts and rational sensual desires fight a kind of civil war for mastery over one and the same personality.

Constant internal modifications of emphasis and characterization conform to the whole plan of this vast novel, and changed its shape in the gradual process of its execution. But it never ceased to be a firm expression of Tolstoy's thoroughly anti-historical attitude to history. He was disrespectful to the so-called great men of history because he sincerely believed that, so far from having *directed* the course of human affairs, they were most often self-seeking, vain adventurers or unconscious puppets, pulled hither and thither by overwhelming forces outside their control. "To us it is incomprehensible," Tolstoy wrote, "that millions of Christian men killed and tortured one another, merely because Napoleon was ambitious, the Emperor Alexander firm, English policy astute, or the Duke of Oldenburg offended." Inevitably, a sense that inscrutable fate decides the course of history, that no man can escape his destiny, invades the mind as soon as it seeks for wider explanations, let alone for first causes, or final aims.

Tolstoy was vehemently attacked by critics for dragging into his novel so many indigestible chunks of what they termed irrelevant philosophy. In fact the reader can easily skip these chunks, but it is hardly fair to dismiss them as totally irrelevant. Tolstoy, like many other thinking people, could not prevent himself from asking

fundamental questions which he recognized as unanswerable. He felt that it was better to admit his ignorance, than to answer the same questions wrongly, and thereby swindle people, as his radical opponents were doing with considerable success.

The historical arguments in *War and Peace* at least try to distinguish sharply between a passive surrender to the rushing current of events, and a wiser mode of fatalism, which first discovers and then obeys the more inescapable laws of nature which also govern human actions. Kutuzov did not save Russia from conquest by Napoleon merely by sitting still and doing nothing. He used events to his advantage by calculating that he need not use his army against the French, so long as frost and hunger remained his most active allies. Though Tolstoy's version of Kutuzov's character and actions cannot be fully substantiated from historical sources, at least his falsifications were not arbitrary, but served to build up a consistent picture of his personality.

He certainly contrived to show that statesmen or military leaders, who blindly challenge fate, fare worse than those who seek to disentangle and understand it. Without being swayed by any patriotic prejudice, Tolstoy saw both the Corsican Napoleon and the Russian Speransky as equally shallow and presumptuous upstarts, drunk with administrative power.

"Napoleon, presented to us as a leader of that whole movement (as savages imagine that the figurehead on a ship's prow to be the power which steers its course), was like a child, who, holding on to the reins of a carriage, thinks that he is the driver." Tolstoy's picture of Napoleon as a vain and pompous little busybody cannot be lightly dismissed as a malicious caricature, even though it conflicts with known historical fact rather more flagrantly than his portrait of Kutuzov. It simply suited Tolstoy's purpose to harp on Napoleon's petty pride at the expense of his more substantial qualities. He deliberately ignored the negative evidence of Napoleon's own memoirs written in St. Helena, which showed him to be much less of a megalomaniac than Tolstoy liked to think, and, indeed, akin to Tolstoy mentally when he made the following historical judgement: "Because I was not master of my actions, because I never succumbed to the madness of thinking that I could force events to fit my own pattern, but on the contrary left my system flexible . . . that made me appear treacherous and inconsistent, and caused men to condemn me."

Not only did Tolstoy deliberately depart from historical accuracy

in order to create a character closer to his own broad conception of *dramatis personae*, but in describing the Russian campaign against Napoleon he often laid on the patriotic colors far more thickly than the facts could justify, and simultaneously forgot all he had said elsewhere to warn his readers against the snares of military glory and national conceit. Like Pushkin before him, he grossly exaggerated and over-simplified that mounting wave of enthusiasm which was said to have drawn all classes of the population together in resistance to the French invader. Many Russian officers were more at home in French than when they spoke their native tongue, and could not force themselves to hate a whole civilized country closer in feeling to them than their own. The hastily conscripted peasants had only the haziest idea of why the war was being fought. Most of them were not even armed, except with pikes. In fact the authorities often thought it safer not to arm them, and several cases were recorded when peasants seized the opportunity to help the French invaders in order to get rid of their oppressive native landlords and officials. Also, they often strenuously resisted handing over provisions to the Russian partisans, who were left behind to harass territory occupied by the French.

Neither does the warm-hearted treatment of French prisoners by the peasants, as described in *War and Peace*, correspond to the testimony of contemporary records, which show that the peasants enjoyed murdering the French and could be callous and cruel to the point of sadism. Furthermore, Tolstoy is so keen to demonstrate Kutuzov's masterly inactivity that he remains silent about the Field-Marshal's well-known military blunders, never mentioning that Kutuzov forgot to use three hundred available Russian guns, which might have shortened the Battle of Borodino considerably, and saved many Russian lives.⁴

The conservative critic, Konstantin Leontiev, openly praised *War and Peace* for the great political service which it rendered through leaving a deep patriotic imprint on the soul of the reader. He welcomed it as a sorely needed corrective to the more familiar Russian craze for tortured self-depreciation and brooding over their own incorrigible vices, and as a genial victory over the morbid and defeatist self-analysis arising out of the Gogol tradition. The glaring historical lapses of the novel did not disturb him in the least, so long as they promoted healthy and useful emotions, superior to

⁴Victor Shklovsky, *Material i Stil'*, Moscow, p. 70.

any pedantic worship of factual accuracy. *War and Peace* rendered a special service in showing that tragedy could also be healthy in kind, and need not be deformed and diseased as in so many contemporary Russian writers; i.e., Dostoevsky's treatment of the tragedy of doss-houses, brothels, and hospitals. The tragedy of *War and Peace* is very helpful, Leontiev frankly urged, because it "disposes the mind to war-like heroism in the service of our country, whereas the tragedies of Dostoevsky could only tantalize the self-indulgence of psychopathic individuals living in squalid lodging houses."

The non-Russian reader, who may be shocked by Leontiev's emphatic approval, will none the less admit that the ideal patriotic tone, which dominated the war-scenes of the novel, temporarily overshadowed Tolstoy's otherwise strong pacifist strain. It is this imaginative rendering of self-surrender and militant loyalty to the state which has endeared *War and Peace*, far above all his other works, to Soviet educationalists, and encouraged the printing of a huge popular edition of this novel at the height of the last world war against Germany.

Yet, on closer view, even this patriotic rendering is far from conventional and certainly not democratic in tone. For it springs from Tolstoy's own vision of a brave, sympathetic, and handsome Emperor, surrounded by loyal and energetic aristocrats, who aroused admiration and enthusiasm on their own account. Leontiev had severely qualified his own brand of patriotism when he said that he failed to understand the French who could love any France and were ready to serve any kind of French government. He added: "I want my country to be worthy of my respect." Tolstoy, for identical reasons, reverted to the period of the Napoleonic wars, because he discerned in it a constellation of vivid and generous-minded individuals, who by their spontaneous example and the personal magnetism which they exerted on those around them, made the Russia of that time far worthier of his respect than she had become in her ambiguous mid-nineteenth century phase.

Not only the personal *genre* of national enthusiasm, but the war scenes themselves, are largely unexpected and equally unconventional. Events are observed through flashes of perception which turn the sequence of military operations into a chaotic mirage. This method helps Tolstoy to fulfil his desire to minimize the part played by the generals, by revealing how remotely the actual course of battle corresponded to their commands and planning. Thus the obscure Captain Tushin saved the situation by keeping his battery

firing in defiance of orders to evacuate his position. In many officers their acute fear of death conflicts with an equal fear of showing cowardice, and both forms of fear smother any subtler or less personal emotions. Napoleon's conversation with captured Russian officers is one of the few passages which smacks of classically correct military attitudes. When Napoleon announces: "Your regiment did its duty honorably," and Prince Repin replies: "The praise of a great commander is a soldier's best reward," the reader may wonder whether Tolstoy's tongue is in his cheek, or whether he is making one of his rare concessions to the classical code of military honor.

That concession, if made at all, is all the more vehemently cancelled out by Prince Andrew's reflections as he lay wounded and immobile on the field of Austerlitz. Napoleon, though formerly his hero, seemed to him now so pitifully insignificant, such a puny figure, absorbed in his shallow ambition and pride in victory, compared with the exalted, just, and benevolent sky, with its free flying clouds, which he saw and understood. Though the mighty Napoleon stood beside him and spoke to him, the Emperor's words conveyed no more sense to Prince Andrew than the buzzing of a fly.

Even the fulsome glorification of the Tsar, both descriptively by Tolstoy himself, and through the medium of the young Nicolas Rostov, exudes a purely individual devotion to the person of Alexander I, which is quite distinct from stereotyped official reverence for the crowned symbol of the Russian Empire. As the Emperor rode over to inspect his regiment, Rostov felt "as happy as a lover awaiting the approach of his beloved. . . . That sun drew nearer and nearer to him, spreading its rays of modest and majestic light, and already he felt himself enveloped in them; he heard Alexander's voice, that affectionate, calm, mighty, and yet simple voice." And at the evening mess Rostov rose to drink to the health, not of His Majesty the Emperor, as they say at official dinner parties, but of the Emperor, "that good, great, and enchanting human being." A few pages further on Tolstoy described the Tsar objectively in almost equally lyrical terms: "a charming combination of majesty and humility shone in his beautiful grey eyes, and his sensitive lips showed the same capacity for varied expression, dominated by pure and benevolent youthfulness."

Indeed, despite Tolstoy's profound and fairly consistent hatred of autocracy in the modern nation-state, he seems to have felt a personal fascination for Alexander I, amounting to a sense of spiritual kinship. The verdict which he pronounced later on the founders

of modern Russia, "the maniac, Ivan the Terrible, the drunken Peter I, the degenerate Paul, the parricide Alexander I," while it made no attempt to distinguish private vices from civic virtues, still left him with a hidden reverence for Alexander, which he showed in his strange story "The Posthumous Writings of the Hermit Fyodor Kuzmich" (1890-1905), reviving the popular legend that Alexander had not died a natural death at Taganrog in 1825, but had secretly renounced the throne in order to spend his last years doing exemplary penance as a wandering monk. Tolstoy clearly felt that Alexander was something like a nineteenth century Buddha, a wise prince who, after long familiarity with the evils which afflicted kingship, decided on his own accord to renounce it, and start to lead a saintly life.

If Tolstoy proved anything implicitly in *War and Peace*, it was the absurdity of trying to turn history into a branch of natural science, capable of leading either to exact conclusions, or of predicting the shape of the future from our inevitably fragmentary knowledge of the past. More positively, he showed that history as an art of creating legends exerted a far more powerful influence on the mind than it did as a science for assembling masses of scattered facts. As a powerful counterblast directed against the embittered topical school of Nekrasov and Pomyalovsky, *War and Peace*, with all its deliberate factual inaccuracies, brought a whole vanished epoch back to life with far more compelling charm, clarity, and beauty of form, than any literary document of contemporary manners had managed to achieve for the modern age. He fulfilled the aim he had set himself when he said: "Every political moment of national life demands from literature reactions which correspond to it and advertise it—but only those works survive which stand higher than that moment; all the others are turned into social manure."

War and Peace has stood the test of time for that very reason, not because it reflected with strict accuracy either the age in which it was written, or the earlier age it described, but because it freely interpreted and went beyond them both. By making the inner flow and importance of personal and home concerns prevail in the end over the ugly and confused pattern of political upheavals, by pouring cold water on the feverish modern preoccupation with constant institutional changes, by denying that these could be called either progressive or reactionary in any intelligible sense, Tolstoy aimed at demolishing the whole conventional attitude to history and social progress. He offered, in compensation, a picture of real human

beings and a vision of non-biological laws which still govern human actions, even if they remain permanently and rightly unfathomable to human intelligence.

The supreme success of Tolstoy's novel in achieving, and going considerably beyond, all that he had set out to do, far from converting his intellectual opponents, roused both radical and conservative circles to a new pitch of vindictive fury against him. He found himself cursed as a reactionary by the former group and condemned as a Nihilist by the latter. The following verdict of the influential critic, Shelgunov, strange as it may sound today, was not exceptional, but typical of the prevalent left-wing attitude to Tolstoy. "It is lucky," he wrote, "that Count Tolstoy does not possess a powerful talent. . . . If he did possess the talent either of Shakespeare or Byron, no curse would suffice to condemn him." Shelgunov, like many other radicals, hated Tolstoy for having dared to draw inspiration from the Russian past, especially from the lives of aristocratic families, instead of singing a hymn to social progress or shedding tears over the uneasy lot of liberated but still poverty-stricken serfs.

Tolstoy fared little better at the hands of the conservative nationalist camp. They accused him of showing unpatriotic and cynical disrespect for the Russian war-heroes of 1812, for captiously finding fault with eminent Russian generals and statesmen, like Kutuzov and Speransky. Even the critic, Strakhov, one of the few who genuinely admired Tolstoy's art, pointed out that certain parts of *War and Peace* served to unmask, rather than to glorify, the high society of the Alexander period. Some scenes in which the Rostov family figured, brought out the aimless, lazy, overfed life of Moscow landowners; and some passages about the behavior of the peasants, (apart from the isolated and purely folk-lore figure of Karataev) suggested sinister bestiality latent in the common people.

The journal, *Voice* (1868), condemned him for devoting too much space to historical scenes, thus ruining the artistic harmony of his novel. The *St. Petersburg News* pronounced that he had "forgotten the basic alphabet of art." *The Russian Archive* (1869) found that his deliberate interweaving of history and fiction had merely damaged both, and that the novel was overburdened with superfluous factual detail and quite irrelevant historical theories. The radical, *Deed*, attacked the novel still more violently as a "disorderly heap of piled-up material" and called its chief characters "elegant bushmen, mentally fossilized and morally ugly." The author of this excep-

tionally spiteful article, Bervi-Flerovsky, had been a poverty-stricken fellow-student with Tolstoy at Kazan University, and relished this opportunity of venting his bitter inferiority complex. He also published, in 1868, a discursive work entitled *The Position of the Working Class in Russia*, which, in fact, won more widespread applause from Russian critics in the seventies than did Tolstoy's masterpiece.

As a rare exception, the novelist, Leskov, wrote a long and penetrating criticism of *War and Peace* in the *Stock Exchange News* (1869), where he observed that "Tolstoy's novel raises for decision many practical questions which from time to time repeat themselves with fatal inexorability—much that enables us to understand better the present through knowledge of the past, and even to guess at the future," but concluded regretfully that Tolstoy's work "will not find talented appreciation in our time, because those who call themselves our critics will weigh him exclusively on the scale of their own prevailing tendencies." Leskov, and to some extent Strakhov, were almost the only contemporary Russian critics whose attitude to *War and Peace* forecast that understanding of Tolstoy as an imaginative historical thinker, which grew up much later among civilized people throughout the world.

Marshal Zhukov*

BY P. RUSLANOV

I

MARSHAL ZHUKOV is one of the few Soviet military men who have acquired great popularity abroad. His name, like that of Eisenhower and Montgomery, is closely bound up with the last world war and has become a part of its history. The best military authorities of the west have spoken favorably of him, and the highest American and British decorations have been conferred upon him. Zhukov is no less popular at home, among the people and in the army. Decisive battles of World War II in the east, beginning with the defense of Moscow and ending with the capture of Berlin, are inseparable from his name. The world press has devoted many pages to him, particularly after he fell into disfavor.

After the fall of Beria, Zhukov was again brought to mind as a likely prospect for becoming a Soviet Bonaparte, and somewhat later as the probable supreme commander of the armed forces of the Eastern Communist bloc which was being projected as a counter-balance to the Atlantic Pact in which Western Germany was participating. In 1955 Marshal Zhukov was appointed Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R. and, naturally, his name again came to the forefront of attention the world over.

A consideration of all that has been written to date about Zhukov confronts one with two incompatible points of view in evaluating his personality. Until now it has not been made clear just what Zhukov is capable of and what can be expected of him. Either he could be a coming Soviet Bonaparte who, relying upon the army for support, will overturn the existing Soviet regime, or else he will save this regime on the battlefields of a future third world war.

I shall limit myself to relating only what I know of Zhukov from personal observations when he served as commander of a tank regiment in the Belorussian Service Command during the thirties; from what was told me by personal, low-ranking acquaintances of mine who were on the staff of the army commanded by Zhukov

*This is the first of two installments of a translation from Russian, in abridged form, of two articles on Marshal Zhukov, which appeared in the New York Russian-language magazine *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* (Socialist Courier), Nos. 2-3 and 4 (February-March and April, 1955) [Ed.]

during the battles on the Kholkhan-Gol River in Mongolia; and from stories told me by his personal adjutant, Major M., who was in Zhukov's service for twenty years. I know little about Zhukov after his transfer to Moscow before and during the war. I was a member of the Soviet occupation troops in Germany, but did not have an opportunity to observe him close at hand. I think that the period of Zhukov's career, beginning with his appearance in Moscow in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and up to the present time is comparatively well known and is less interesting than his early, prewar career.

Zhukov's conscious life consists of his service in the Red Army. They began together. He entered the Party at the same time that he entered the army and his entire life has been bound up with both. When quite a young man he enlisted in the Red Army as a volunteer and was assigned to Budenny's Cavalry Army. He spent the entire Civil War, from beginning to end, as a member of this army. He participated personally in the fighting against the cavalry of General Mamontov, he carried out the well-known thousand-kilometer march of Budenny's First Cavalry Army from the Polish front to the Crimea, against Wrangel, and he took part in the storming of Perekop. He ended the war in the Crimea with Budenny's Cavalry Army as commander of a cavalry troop. He had a few battle wounds, and decorations were conferred upon him. When the Civil War ended, Zhukov decided to remain in the army and become a professional soldier, continuing his service with the Sixth Chongarsky Division which was commanded by Timoshenko. At that time Budenny's Cavalry Army was the most powerful and battle-fit unit in the entire Red Army, its élite, and the main support of the Soviet government. To be a Red Army Budenny man was a great honor at that time and those who were members of this army were proud of belonging to such a privileged arm of the service. At the time, the Budenny men constituted a sort of caste which preserved its privileges until the beginning of the great purges in the Party and in the army. For example, they were the only men in the entire Red Army who were allowed, by way of exception, to wear mustaches. Even after the thirties, in the cities of Belorussia, one could observe exotic figures with enormous Budenny mustaches, wearing Cossack *burkas* (felt military cloaks), and rattling their imposing sabres along on small wheels.

Upon the termination of the Civil War, the entire Red Army began to convert to a peace-time basis and a redistribution of troops

was carried out. Budenny's Cavalry Army ceased to exist as an army unit and was reorganized into cavalry corps which were placed in the most important sectors of the western border of the country. Individual corps became part of the forces of the three Service Commands set up along the western border: Leningrad, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. The two best cavalry divisions of Budenny's army, the Fourth and Sixth Chongarsky Divisions, became part of the forces of the Belorussian Service Command. They were consolidated into a cavalry corps which was commanded in turn by Timoshenko and Apanasenko. Zhukov and his troops found themselves members of this corps. His subsequent career developed slowly without advancement in rank. There were no vacancies. There were many Budenny men in the corps who were better known than Zhukov and the corps did not increase in numbers.

Then a program was initiated to revamp and educate the entire Red Army. Tactics were improved, military thought was developed along newer lines, yet the Red Army had continued to live by the traditions of the Civil War and had glorified for too long the bravery of Budenny and Chapaev on the Civil War fronts. Moscow realized that such a situation could not go on indefinitely and decided that it was time to train the command personnel and to transform them into men who were literate in the military sense of the word. Appropriate orders were issued to this effect with the reminder that advancement in rank would depend on the results of this training. The command personnel of the other arms of the service resigned themselves to this new development without a word of complaint, and, somehow or other, they managed to study. But the Budenny men were resentful and regarded the innovation as an insult to their heroic battle glory and as a personal slight. Only a few, the more intelligent among them, understood that it was necessary to study, and took advantage of this opportunity. Zhukov was among these. He undertook and completed the entire course of study at the military academy.

Upon his return early in the thirties, Zhukov was appointed commander of a cavalry regiment. The authorities were pleased with him. It was obvious that the academy stood him in good stead. This was perhaps all that he could achieve. He could hardly become the commander of a cavalry division because there were only two of them in the entire Service Command and there were many candidates for this position who were better known than he.

In his well-known monograph: "On the Role of Personality in

History," Plekhanov rightly pointed out that the gifted individual could not rise high unless historical conditions favored such a rise. Plekhanov showed that Napoleon would never have become the man known to history if not for the French Revolution. Without the Revolution, Napoleon could have been at best a little-known Colonel Bonaparte. In Russia too, in exactly the same manner, Budenny, and others like him, would not have become marshals without the Revolution, but would have remained the same non-commissioned cavalry officers that they had been.

How, then, did Colonel Zhukov in the course of five years become the Chief of the General Staff of the entire Red Army, then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of all of the armed forces of the country, a marshal, holder of many decorations, and three times Hero of the Soviet Union, of whom there are only three in the whole country? Such a rise on Zhukov's part can in no way be explained by his abilities alone. Among the generals of the Soviet Army there have been and there are now, able military leaders; but either they perished in prisons during the years of the great purges under Yezhov or else they hold minor secondary positions. Thus, the reasons for Zhukov's rapid rise have other roots and these must be sought in the historical conditions which favored his career. Such conditions were at hand at that time. The most important of them, were the basic reorganization of the entire Red Army, aiming at its mechanization and motorization; and the Tukhachevsky affair. World War II should also be counted among these conditions, but by its beginning Zhukov had already reached the summit of the Soviet military pyramid and his subsequent advancement was assured.

Even before the thirties, mechanization and motorization of the Red Army had long since begun, but steps were undertaken to proceed in this direction very rapidly for reasons of foreign policy, particularly after the threat of Hitler's advent to power. Hitler, as is well-known, based his foreign policy on expansion to the east (*Drang nach Osten*). The Kremlin understood this danger at the time and reacted to it very painfully. This also served as the chief impetus to the accelerated modernization of the Red Army. War industry and heavy industry, as the main foundation of mechanization and motorization, had already been built up by that time, but there was not yet any definite military doctrine with regard to these problems, and naturally, no one had the necessary knowledge for the practical execution of these concepts.

On the eve of World War II, tanks and air power presented the armies of the world, including the Red Army, with problems which altered centuries-old military concepts and principles. For many armies these problems proved to be beyond their strength both organizationally and materially. The French handled these problems very poorly and paid dearly. Germany, at that time, spurred on by revenge, played a leading role in the development of the new military thought. Colonel-General von Seeckt, the commander of the German Reichswehr, developed the strategy of the "Blitzkrieg" which made mechanization and motorization the basic elements of their future army.

Von Seeckt's ideas produced a favorable impression in the Kremlin. His greatest follower was Marshal Tukhachevsky, who enjoyed Stalin's support. It was decided to follow the example of the Germans and motorize the cavalry divisions of Budenny's former Cavalry Army. This measure was begun in the cavalry corps of the Belorussian Service Command, in one of the divisions in which Zhukov was serving. It was decided to set up a regiment of high-speed tanks with each division. Inasmuch as the new concept was an important experiment upon whose outcome very much depended, the question of the candidates for the positions of commanders of these two tank regiments was very grave. Such great significance was attached to this matter that the final decision was made not in the corps or even in the Service Command but in Moscow. The choice fell on Zhukov and on another exemplary cavalry regiment commander, Pavlov, who was afterwards shot, in 1941, while serving as commander of the troops of the Belorussian Special Service Command (BOVO).

It is necessary to mention now one apparently unimportant but nevertheless very essential circumstance, namely the personal influence of Stalin himself on Zhukov's career. The notion exists that Stalin could not have directed everything, particularly minor matters such as the appointment of Zhukov, and that he occupied himself only with decisions on the most important matters of state, entrusting everything else to confidential persons on whom he checked from time to time by some sort of intricate "spot check system." This is a mistaken idea. Stalin's distinction and success stemmed from the fact that he himself paid close attention to minor details, frequently very petty ones, which seemed important to him. To corroborate my statements, I shall cite a few generally known facts. The story of the flight of Chkalov, Baydukov, and

Belyakov, following the Moscow-North Pole-Far East route is well known. This was called "the Stalin Route." The Soviet newspapers described the preparations for the flight and carried photographs of Stalin with the pilots beside a huge relief globe in Stalin's office. He spent a great deal of time participating in the preparations for the flight and was even present at the take-off.

In the newspaper, *Red Star*, the well-known designer and armorer, Degtyarev, told how he had been invited to come and see Stalin at 5 o'clock in the morning during the Finnish War. Of course, it is difficult to call this an invitation. He was simply awakened at 5 o'clock in the morning and taken off to the Kremlin. The aged Degtyarev told how Stalin received him cordially and had at once led him into a neighboring room, in the middle of which stood a large table covered with captured Finnish weapons, most of which were sub-machine guns. Stalin showed Degtyarev an American Thompson sub-machine gun and said: "Here is our Enemy No. 1 in Finland. We are suffering enormous losses in Finland because we don't have such a weapon yet, even though we do have good designers and arms factories." Degtyarev went on to tell about Stalin's assignment to him of the task of creating his own sub-machine gun for the Fatherland. He carried out this assignment by designing the "PPD" sub-machine gun (Degtyarev Sub-Machine Gun). Moreover, Degtyarev told how Stalin had frequently asked him on the telephone how he felt and whether he, Degtyarev, didn't need his, Stalin's, assistance in some matter.

Furthermore, I shall cite Yelagin's book *The Taming of the Arts* in which he tells of Stalin personally calling up the out-of-favor poet Pasternak and promising his assistance.

For Stalin, the search for necessary capable personnel was something of a sport. He did it systematically, thus constantly injecting new life into his élite. The personal idiosyncracies of his character also played a certain role in this. If he simply liked someone, that person's success was assured, and this frequently decided the fate of writers, actors, military men, and scholars. Pilot Chkalov chanced to come to his attention, a man who really had nothing to offer, but did possess great bravery and boldness in the air. He was discharged from the air force several times for his recklessness, but Stalin took a liking to him and he became a much-decorated hero of the Soviet Union and a city was named for him. Seaman Papanin similarly came to Stalin's notice, and he too became a famous hero of the Soviet Union, an admiral, and even a doctor of geographical

sciences. Zhukov, too, came to Stalin's attention. Chkalov and Papanin did not reveal great capabilities though they remained show figures. Zhukov, however, did reveal remarkable capabilities and Stalin's patronage proved to be decisive in Zhukov's appointment to the position of commander of the experimental tank regiment.

Thus, the way was opened for Zhukov but, upon instructions from Stalin, he still had to pass a severe practical test. The first step in this test was the tank regiment which Zhukov was to set up and command. He fully realized what was required of him and he set about his work with unusual zeal and enterprise. His future success was assured by the very fact that he understood his main task only too well. He was faced with the task of forming a regiment which would be equal to anything confronting it and, most important of all, he had to create a new type of soldier, the tankman-soldier.

In general, very great demands are placed upon the tankman-soldier, as compared with other types of ground troops. He must possess considerable technical knowledge, theoretical and practical, he must know the tactics of tank combat under various conditions, and he must know how to fight without tank protection. The process of preparation and training of the tankman-soldier is therefore complex and lengthy. This is a problem on which work is going on even now in all the armies of the world. For these reasons, even though for the most part qualified workers from industrial centers have joined the tank forces in the Red Army, nevertheless the Soviet tankman-soldier is still overloaded with work. It is owing to this fact that discipline, soldierly bearing, etc. suffered, and even now sometimes suffer, in the tank regiments of the Soviet army. There were instances in some units when from morning till evening the men did not remove their fatigue clothes, often went on guard duty wearing them, and did not wear their prescribed insignia of rank. It was difficult to distinguish which of them was the superior and which the subordinate. An inadmissible arrogance developed in relation to other branches of the army. Frequently conflicts and frictions in tactical exercises arose between the commanders of various branches of the army and the tankmen. Tanks were usually attached to the infantry and cavalry for combined operations, and the tank-commanders were usually subordinate to the commanding officer to whom they were attached.

All these difficulties had developed to a serious degree before Zhukov's time. A new regiment armed with complicated and high-

speed tanks was involved. This regiment, together with a cavalry division, had to be able to solve important strategical problems. There was as yet no experience in this field, and Zhukov had to rely more on his own intuition than on service manuals, to say nothing of orders. Everything was new. Staff work, communications with the rear, and especially operational administration from the rear presented enormous difficulties in such mobile troops. A great deal was required of the commander of such a regiment. Zhukov swiftly became, in the regiment, the center from which everything stemmed: initiative, leadership, and control; he saw everything himself and as a consequence knew everything. He was to be found at headquarters only as much as was necessary for the settlement of staff matters. He spent all the remaining time outside of headquarters personally observing all aspects of regimental life. He observed, learned and taught others. He did this with a rare patience and self-control, and exacted fulfillment of duty in a persistent, methodical, and well-thought-out manner. He never shouted and never upbraided anyone. No one ever saw him lose his temper or burst into a rage. This had tremendous educational value for his subordinates. But if admonitions did not help, then he could, without the slightest hesitation, turn someone over for court martial, whenever the interests of the service required it.

From the very beginning, Zhukov impressed upon his subordinates that they were first of all soldiers and then tankmen. He saw to it that everyone without exception wore the prescribed uniform and the assigned insignia of rank, irrespective of circumstances. He categorically forbade anyone to appear in fatigue clothes outside of the workshops, garages, and tank-fields. There was, to be sure, a certain amount of inertia among Zhukov's tankmen too, but he broke it gradually and unceremoniously, first among the command personnel, and afterwards among the rank and file. He introduced the principle: "If you don't know how, we'll teach you; if you don't want to, we'll make you."

(To be continued)

Book Reviews

HUSZAR, GEORGE B. DE AND ASSOCIATES. *Soviet Power and Policy.* New York, Crowell, 1955. 598 pp. \$8.75.

This is one more symposium on the Soviet Union, but, as the title indicates, one devoted to a particular purpose, that of relating the foreign policy of the Soviets to the power accumulated by them as the result of long years of collectivization, industrialization, and indoctrination. The book consists of two parts (in the table of contents one finds four, but the first and the last are no more than a short introduction and a short conclusion). Of the two major parts, the first covers almost two thirds of the volume, and is devoted to Soviet power; the second concerns itself with the meaning of this power in terms of actual and virtual expansion.

In the first part, the reader is offered a survey of the geographical and demographic background of Soviet power, of the political and economic structure, of the ideology and its inculcation through education and propaganda, of the system of controls and of the armed forces. The three last chapters of this section are devoted to topics forming a kind of transition to the second part, namely, to foreign Communist parties, foreign trade, and foreign policy in general. The individual chapters have been largely written by scholars who have not yet had the opportunity to publish their views on the subjects; but all have competently and intelligently digested the material available in monographs, articles, and other publications. Here and there, errors have

crept in. Thus, for instance, in the table showing the growth of the population, the area for the year 1897 is that of the Russian Empire, but the population is only that which, according to best estimates, lived in the territory of the Soviet Union within the boundaries of 1921-39. The chapter on controls contains an historical introduction based on incorrect information: The Preobrazhensky guard regiment never had police or judiciary functions; Count Benckendorff never abolished the secret police; the Okhrana did not begin to disintegrate in 1915; and the 1934 change in the system of political police was by no means fundamental. But the summary of the topic is excellent. The present reviewer would, however, disagree with the statement that the inability of the Soviet leaders to achieve the Marxist goal of the withering away of the state, constitutes a basic weakness of the regime.

In the chapter on education, periods are formed depending on the general development of the Soviet Union, so that great changes in the system of education itself remain in the background. Moreover, the author assumes that, in 1917, the coefficient of literacy was about thirty percent while two independent investigations (one by this reviewer published in *The Russian Review* volume 2, number 1, and another by Rashevsky in Moscow, in 1940) came to the conclusion that the percentage was above forty. This error results in a gross exaggeration of the success of the efforts

of the Soviet government to eradicate illiteracy.

The second major part of the volume, to which de Huszar has devoted half of the chapters, is too short to be meaningful. Such large and diversified areas as Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, Southeastern Asia, Northeastern Asia (a poor term with which to designate China, Japan, and Korea) are treated in twenty-odd pages each. Nevertheless, the strategic position, the Soviet penetration, actual and virtual, the chances of successful resistance are ably, however briefly discussed. The conclusion, again written by de Huszar, is quite interesting, since the world situation is discussed, first in terms of classical geopolitics (Mackinder style), then of heretical geopolitics (N. Spykman style). The incompatibility of the two interpretations proves once again that monistic approaches to the analysis of social situations are useless. No novel recommendations as to American policy are offered by de Huszar, but in a field already explored hundreds of times this hardly could be expected.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

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TREADGOLD, DONALD W. *Lenin and His Rivals*. New York, Praeger, 1955. 291 pp. \$5.00.

The historian of the Russian revolutionary movement faces formidable obstacles. He must peel off layer on layer of obfuscation and distortion which Soviet historians have utilized to propagate their version of victor's history and to discredit the rivals who fell by the way. He must tread a cautious path through the heavy underbrush of

émigré polemics and avoid the stale recriminations which relieve feeling but shed little light. Above all, he must go to the record to rediscover the interplay of political forces of the time and to recapture the sense of the contingent and unpredictable which differentiates living history from retrospective omniscience.

Indeed, this is what Professor Treadgold has done with admirable restraint and detachment, if not always with felicity of style. He has given us an unfolding panorama of the revolutionary movement during the fateful years from 1898 to 1906 in which Lenin and the Bolsheviks recede to their true proportions and are seen as merely one extreme strand in the complex tapestry of Russia's revolutionary hopes and aspirations. Even though there is little new in the analysis of Lenin's own doctrines and tactics, there is much that is revealing on his relations with other political groupings; and there are full scale treatments of Martov, Miliukov, and Chernov which represent substantial contributions in rounding out our understanding of what Professor Treadgold calls the First Popular Front against Tsardom.

For, great as were the differences which divided Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, SR's and Kadets, they were as one in their enmity toward the autocracy during this period. "March apart, strike together"—thus went the slogan. "In 1905," Basil Maklakov observed, "there was organized one common front, from the revolutionaries to the conservative sections of our society." The front was soon to dissolve, but even as it was disintegrating, such liberals as Miliukov continued to look to the Left for allies and to behave as if the main enemy were

on the Right. The milieu of 1905 bred its own strange bedfellows, but the prescience of hindsight probably makes them appear stranger to us than they appeared to each other.

The political organizations which moved to the center of the stage in the 1905 period represented a curious phenomenon. Their leadership was confined to a handful of intellectuals who were mostly estranged from the masses for whom they purported to speak. Their relations with each other were characterized by endless polemics and schisms which seemed only distantly related to the concerns of the discontented multitude whose grievances they hoped to exploit. Much of their debate was carried on at an abstract level which was largely unintelligible to the peasants and workers to whom they hoped to appeal. Marxism provided the pole-star of doctrinal disputation. As Professor Treadgold puts it, "Lenin and Martov were orthodox Marxists; Chernov accepted much of Marxism; Miliukov made his peace with it," at least in the sense of accepting the Marxist categories as a point of departure for debate. Their disputations seemed admirably designed to engage the attention of narrow circles of intellectuals and almost to guarantee that their voices would not reach beyond.

Yet it was precisely these groups—Kadets, Social Democrats, and SR's—who were able to rush in and fill the political vacuum which the 1905 Revolution created. They became, at least for a period, the most important political parties in the country and burst out of their constricted circles to give leadership to a host of inchoate dissatisfactions which found no other available political channels of expression. But

the measure of their success was also the measure of their weakness. The bonds which united them to their constituencies were at best tenuous, and the masses who followed their lead in the moment of revolutionary incandescence relapsed into quiescence as the autocracy rallied its forces. Professor Treadgold ends his story in 1906, but the struggle to shape Russia's future continued, and the revolutionary intelligentsia who met frustration in 1905 found a more propitious setting in 1917.

Professor Treadgold interprets the 1905 Revolution "as the story of the first Popular Front." "It was the dogma of the time," he points out, "that for the opposition parties there was 'no enemy on the Left'." The mistake of the Kadets, he argues, "was not in the extent to which they compromised their fidelity to the revolutionaries, but in the degree to which they maintained it." The Mensheviks and the SR's are similarly indicted for their willingness to maintain a socialist front with the Bolsheviks and for clinging to the illusion of common interests long after the Kadets had abandoned it. He sees Lenin's coalition politics in 1905—his flirtations with the SR's, Trudoviks, and even Mensheviks—as a kind of dress rehearsal for the Popular Front strategy of the mid-thirties. The analogy seems to me strained, but it contains at least one germ of truth. For Lenin, alliances were always visualized as a field of maneuver in which the Bolsheviks pressed for hegemony; in this sense, at least, there is a strand of continuity which deserves emphasis. Even if Professor Treadgold's efforts to extract a moral from his tale have an occasional unhistorical ring, his analysis

of the revolutionary movement itself remains a solid contribution. His book is to be welcomed as a substantial addition to a rapidly growing body of scholarly monographs which have done much to correct the distortions of Soviet historiography and to enlarge our understanding of Russian intellectual history in the pre-Soviet period.

MERLE FAINSOD

Harvard University

SCHOLMER, JOSEPH. *Vorkuta*. New York, Henry Holt, 1955. 304 pp.
\$3.75.

This is a truly exciting story, presented soberly and lucidly by a shrewd and intelligent observer. Dr. Scholmer was the head radiologist at Leipzig University when he was arrested by the NKVD in 1949. Accused of espionage and sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor, he spent three years in Vorkuta, a prison complex of 250,000 slave workers, situated on the desolate tundra at the northern terminus of the Ural Mountains where slave coal miners were patching a gaping hole in the Russian economy.

Most of the reports on the Soviet slave camps came from refugee Poles and Russians able to escape during World War II; to them were added accounts of former Soviet officials who defected to the West. Also, official Soviet documents hinted at a vast productive force which could be explained only by the use of slave labor.

Scholmer's eyewitness report on the social processes going on in Vorkuta is not only intensely interesting but also provides first-rate material for the student of Soviet Russia, especially the sociologist. In fact,

it has all the earmarks of the authenticity so much needed when studying rumors, reports, or documents relating to that large slave-camp. Scholmer describes the mental attitudes of the various prisoners. The Russian elements were mostly intellectuals and ex-students. Especially suggestive are various comments, such as the failure of the Western Allies to utilize such camps as hostile centers in the enemy rear, the persistence of anti-Semitism among the prisoners, and how uncoordinated underground movements operate even in prisons. The psychologist will benefit from analyzing the author's description of the brainwashing processes used by Soviet authorities and of the various types of Communist administrators.

The description of the changes in camp policy after the death of Stalin are extremely significant. The prisoners mining coal at Vorkuta expected the intolerable system to collapse; they were encouraged by reports that Beria had released a handful of their number and then by reports of the rising in Berlin on June 17, 1953. The story of the sudden strike at Vorkuta in July, repressed by force and trickery, climaxes Scholmer's story of his imprisonment by the Russians.

The author offers some pertinent comments why this particular strike was actually ineffective. The leaders failed to make use of that form of strike which, throughout the history of strikes, has always proved the most effective: the sitdown strike. They allowed everything to be thrashed out in the camp itself instead of in the pit—the exclusive preserve of the prisoners; the prisoners' shock troops failed to get possession of technical key points, and by

staying in the camps gave the NKVD their chance to sort out, isolate, and remove the most active elements in the strike. But the strike "had a profound effect not only on the prisoners but also on the civilian population in other parts of the Soviet Union." Above all, the planned economy of the U.S.S.R. is far more vulnerable to strikes than "capitalist" society, since the army of millions of prisoners "literally controls the supply of basic raw materials (fifty percent of the coal and eighty percent of the wood). A strike not only in Vorkuta but in every region administered by the NKVD would certainly have the effect of shaking the Soviet economic system to its foundations."

Dr. Scholmer's book is rich in concrete detail, illustrations, and valuable observations. It should be read by all those interested in how the Soviets operate their slave cities.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

PASZKIEWICZ, HENRYK. *The Origin of Russia*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1954. 556 pp. 63s.

The author of this work has set for himself the task of exploring the problem of Russia's origin. He includes in his study certain problems of Russia's later history, particularly the period from the ninth to the fifteenth century, which he deems relevant to his subject and, in this connection, also dwells upon some problems of Polish and Lithuanian history. The work is doubtlessly the fruit of considerable labor. It has, however, many weaknesses which have to do with an arbitrary use of the sources, an insufficient acquaintance with the literature on

the subject, and unsubstantiated conclusions.

With reference to sources, the author writes (p. 140): "As to the Arab writers, we read of Varangians living among the Slavs in Masudi" (956 A.D.). We know, however, that Masudi wrote of Slavs and Rus, not of Slavs and Varangians (El-Masudi's *Historical Encyclopedia*, translated by A. Sprenger, 1841, I. pp. 407-408). Masudi could not have mentioned the Varangians, and we could not have read about them in his work, for the simple reason that Arab scholars of the tenth century had no knowledge of them. This being so, to "correct" Masudi by substituting "Varangians" for the term "Rus" is arbitrary and unscientific. The same goes for the author's substitution of "Roman Sea" for Nestor's "Russian Sea."

Here is a voluminous work on Russian history on which the author investigates some important problems of that history, basing his conclusions almost exclusively on the literature of the last two or three decades. It is, of course, a good thing to be acquainted with the latest works on the subject; nevertheless, a knowledge of the writings of the basic authorities on Russian history—Karamzin, S. M. Solovyov, and Kliuchevsky—is imperative. Yet the author does not even mention Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, nor does he ever refer to Solovyov's classic *History of Russia from Ancient Times*, of which volume twenty-nine contains an analysis of most of the problems discussed by the author of the book under review. The very name, S. M. Solovyov, is mentioned only once or twice and that in reference to secondary matters. As to Kliuchevsky, Mr. Paszkiewicz does indeed refer to

some of his works; yet despite the fact that Kliuchevsky has thoroughly explored the early "regional" period of Russian history and, in particular, has given a searching analysis of the reasons for the rise of Moscow, the author, in chapter XIII of his book bearing the title "Rise of Moscow," fails to give us so much as a brief summary, let alone a critical examination, of Kliuchevsky's views.

Elsewhere the author, discussing the Normanist and anti-Normanist schools, blames the latter for having "disregarded or altogether omitted" the sources indicated by him (p. 125, footnote I). This only goes to show that he is not familiar with the basic works of the anti-Normanist school dealing with these problems—the writings of Ewers, Gedeonov, Illovaisky, and Bagaley.

It is natural, therefore, that in his statements and conclusions he reflects the opinions of others, most often those of A. Solovyov (not to be confused with S. M. Solovyov) and M. N. Pokrovsky. The author's general conclusion (p. 329)—except for an obviously personal and entirely unfounded thrust at the Church of Constantinople—is nothing but a paraphrase of Pokrovsky's views. He shows a greater degree of independence in maintaining that "Rus" means "faith of Rus," and that the Russians, at least up to the seventeenth century, were not a nation. Both these assertions are clearly indefensible.

The author contends that the term "Rus" has a geographical meaning, standing for "land of Rus" (let us ignore here the inaccuracy of his definition) as well as a religious one, "faith of Rus." Yet not one of the examples cited by him contains a mention of "faith of Rus," nor

does the word *yazyk* have such a meaning (it may have had the connotation of "faith" some time in the remote past, but no longer in the ninth century); ever since the ninth century it has meant "land" or "people" in all the sources. As is known, in 1054, Christianity split into two branches—Roman-Catholic Christianity with its local Churches and Eastern Greek-Orthodox Christianity with its own local Churches. But to assume a distinctive "faith of Rus" is unwarrantable; such a faith never did exist. Otherwise one would have to speak of a Bulgarian, a Serbian, a Georgian faith, and, on the other side, an Italian, a Spanish, or a Polish faith. This, of course, is nonsense.

The author denies categorically that "Rus" in the period in question was a nation. As evidence he quotes the following passage from the Chronicle: "This only is the Slav *yazyk* in Rus: the Polyanians, the Drevlians, the people of Novgorod . . ." etc. (p. 17). This would indicate beyond doubt that the Slav *yazyk* (people) represented the supertribal organization uniting the above tribes into a single nation, "Rus." The author, however, rejects this interpretation, pointing out that the above enumeration does not include all Slav tribes and lists only seven of them. Further, in dealing with the attack of the Lithuanians on Rus and their successes, he insists that if the Russians had then been a nation they would not have let this happen (pp. 226 and 252). He makes the same observation with regard to the Tartars (pp. 303-304). These assertions are not at all convincing.

As for the problem of the origin of "Rus," the author ranges himself with the Norman school. He fails

to contribute anything new in support of that theory, and his acquaintance with the sources and the literature on the subject is superficial. We shall not here go into the issue as a whole but shall cite only a few examples to illustrate what we have said. Thus, for instance, the author regards the evidence by Ibrahim Ibn Yakub as particularly important. Actually there is no such evidence. The original text is not extant, and the text that has come down to us is a mere paraphrase of the original. This is not a source to be called upon as evidence in a serious problem of scholarship. The author also refers to Liutprand as evidence. It is a moot question whether Liutprand, in using the term "Nordmani" had in mind "people of the North," in a geographical sense (*a positione loci*), or else, in particular, Scandinavians, on the basis of origin. Regarding the first opinion, the author remarks: "Such opinion cannot be treated seriously unless documentary proof could be provided that the Slavs were, at any time, known under the name of Norsemen" (p. 417). This statement only demonstrates the author's inadequate knowledge of the pertinent sources and literature. The "documentary proof" he insists upon has been provided long ago by J. Ewers, *Kritische Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der Russen*, 1814, pp. 139, 148, and footnote 5; it has been supplemented by Gedeonov, "Otryvki," *Zapiski Akademii Nauk*, I, 1826, pp. 94-98. But the author is not acquainted with Ewers or Gedeonov, or with the sources cited by them.

The author deals no less superficially with other source material, such as references to Rus in Constantine Porphyrogenetus, the Ber-

tinian annals, as well as with Nestor's evidence regarding Varangians. Some of the author's statements are put forward without any documentation and cannot be taken seriously at all, as for instance, his assertion that the Great Russians are a Finnish nation.

Thus, because of insufficient acquaintance with the sources and with the findings of his predecessors, the author has failed to provide a serious contribution to Russian history. Inadequate knowledge and superficiality of treatment have prevented him from throwing new light on the problem of Russia's origin.

V. RIASANOVSKY
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KUKIEL, M. *Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770-1861*. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1955. 354 pp. \$6.00.

All students of East-European affairs should be indebted to Professor Marian Kukiel for his illuminating work on the role of Prince Adam Czartoryski as a European federalist.

Kukiel's biography sketches the activities of Czartoryski against a broad background of European politics. Unlike the work of the late Professor Marceli Handelsman, this volume emphasizes the two most important documents produced by Czartoryski: his *Essai sur la diplomatie* of 1827, and his memorandum on "The Political System to be Adopted by Russia." This important memorandum, submitted to Tsar Alexander I in 1803, about which Professor A. Lobanov-Rostovsky did not hesitate to write that it "formed the guiding principles of Russo-Turkish relations throughout

the nineteenth century," is analyzed by Kukiel in detail in the chapter entitled "Czartoryski, a Russian Statesman."

The *Essai sur la diplomatie* is Czartoryski's main literary work apart from his *Memoirs*. It was finished in 1827, but the first edition did not appear in print until June, 1830, in Marseilles, under the pseudonym, "Philhellène."

The *Essai* devotes much space to Russia and her role in the world. Czartoryski's observations are all the more interesting because his whole life was passed in close relationship with that country. Beginning with the campaign of 1792, his internship at Catherine's court, his adjutancy and subsequent friendship with the young heir to the throne, later Tsar Alexander I, his post as envoy to the Sardinian court, and culminating in his two years as Russian Foreign Minister, Czartoryski's relationship to Russia passed into an opposition phase, finally to become *volens nolens* one of open hostility, to which he was driven by the events of the Polish uprising of 1830-31. Thus we see Czartoryski as a soldier fighting against Russia, as a hostage, a politician trying to achieve collaboration and union with Russia, an oppositionist, a member of the revolutionary government, and, in the last phase of his life, as the leader of an émigré movement which based its hopes on an armed intervention against Russia by the European powers. His profound studies and unusual experience made it possible for Czartoryski to attain a wider knowledge of European affairs than that of any other contemporary diplomat.

When the orientation of Russian foreign policy shifted and Alexander

rejected the idea of carrying out plans concerning Poland (worked out jointly by himself and Czartoryski), the latter resigned his post as Foreign Minister in 1806. Before his resignation he had presented to the Tsar a memorandum in which he formulated the idea of a union between Poland and Russia, based on a system "in which would exist a natural harmony between the rights and the interests of both countries." He envisioned this as consisting of a respect for the national rights of Poland, guaranteed constitutionally, and an adoption by the Russian foreign policy of the idea of a European League of Nations. The memorandum maintained that the test of Russia's peaceful attitude towards Europe lay in her relationship to Poland. If subjugated by Russia, Poland could only be a jumping-off point for further conquests. The memorandum further observed that, in general, Russia's possession of non-Russian territories committed her to the autocratic regime and made internal reforms much more difficult. The establishment, however, of a constitutional regime in Russia would favorably influence her foreign policy. "Russia's appearance in Europe," wrote Czartoryski, "desirable and necessary under the condition that she should observe the laws of right and justice, has become a fatal source of new complications in consequence of the acts of aggression committed by her . . . By widening her sway to the south and west, and being by nature inaccessible from the east and north, Russia has become a source of constant danger for Europe. . . . Have her conquests of Polish territory become a source of strength for Russia? Russia needs neither

new territories nor new population, as her population is growing at the same rate as that of the United States . . . Control of Poland is also not necessary to assure to Russia the possibility of exerting a decisive influence on the fate of Europe. Being a continent in herself, and a continent with inexhaustible resources in men and raw materials, she should, rather, incline her rulers to occupy themselves with making available and exploiting all these natural riches for the benefit of the population."

Thus, by concentrating on problems of international development and surrounding herself with friendly and loyal allies, Russia could extend her influence and authority, and permanently ensure her own interests, without losing anything of her strength or prestige. "A good and loyal friend," he wrote, "is in the long run always more worthwhile than a slave."

Because of its emphasis on Czartoryski's activities as a Russian statesman and his relations with the Russians, Kukiel's penetrating and well-balanced biography is a valuable contribution to the history of Russo-Polish relations.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI
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The Memoirs of Catherine the Great.
Edited by Dominique Maroger,
with an introduction by G. P.
Gooch. Translated from the
French by Moura Budberg. New
York, Macmillan, 1955. 400 pp.
\$5.00.

Certain written works of great personalities of history, like certain works of great artists, acquire renown more by hearsay than by

acquaintance. The memoirs of Catherine II have fallen somewhat into this category. Although read with great interest in nineteenth century Europe, after publication of the Herzen edition [1859] in England, France, and Germany, in recent years the memoirs have been less accessible, in English at least, than one might imagine. In 1907 an authorized version in the original French was published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Science. This event passed almost unnoticed, although it brought to light a number of irregularities in the Herzen edition, which had been compiled from an unauthorized copy of the memoirs. Somewhat later a German translation of the memoirs appeared, edited by Erich Boehme, who claimed to have restored certain passages omitted from the 1907 edition. An English translation of the Boehme edition was made in 1927 by Katharine Anthony. So many liberties were taken by Boehme and Anthony in arranging and translating the work, however, that its integrity was seriously jeopardized. Meanwhile, the Herzen edition in English having gone out of print, historians came to rely more and more on French, German, and Italian versions of dubious quality. The appearance of the Maroger edition in English, therefore, is an event of considerable interest, for it makes an important eighteenth century work readily available again, and draws attention once more to the undeniable charm of a great Russian Empress.

Catherine's memoirs, begun about 1755, cover the period from her early childhood through 1759. From the standpoint of history, therefore, the work is of primary interest as a source from the reign of Empress

Elizabeth (1741-1762). It deals principally with Catherine's childhood, her arrival and reception in Russia, her betrothal and marriage, and her life as a Grand Duchess at the court of Elizabeth. In her appraisal of these years Catherine has made many valuable observations for the historian. The sketch of her childhood at Zerbst, Stettin, and Berlin, though brief, nevertheless shows in vivid detail the worldly, contentious atmosphere that surrounded this daughter of an eighteenth century German princeling. The portraits of Empress Elizabeth and Grand Duke Peter emerge in full length from the mosaic of daily events at the court of St. Petersburg, and are devastating in their revelations of character, or lack of it. Despite the uniformly blackening treatment to which Catherine has subjected her husband, Grand Duke Peter, the underlying tragedy of this royal "teen-ager" and "playboy" is not entirely obscured. Peter was undeniably selfish, cruel, treacherous, and unstable, and he was never, for all his royal position, a match for his clever, attractive wife, who manipulated him with remarkable success. One cannot avoid an occasional sense of sympathy for this overgrown child, whose mental processes were transparent and who repeatedly gave evidence of recognizing his faults, but never progressing beyond the stage of trying to hide them.

On the delicate matter of the succession, on which rested the whole dynastic claim of the Romanovs to the Empire, there is a tantalizing lack of information. Despite the editor's contentions that the memoirs show that Emperor Paul, Catherine's son and heir, had no Romanov blood in his veins, the

evidence in the memoirs falls short of confirming such a conclusion. It is true that Catherine's statements on the subject are ambiguous and appear to show how unlikely were marital relations between herself and Peter. But neither does she deny that such relations ever took place, nor do her reports of Peter's comments and conduct on the birth of her two children exclude the possibility. On matters of corresponding importance to the Romanov dynasty, such as the circumstances surrounding the death of her husband, Catherine maintains an equally discreet and non-committal position. As G. P. Gooch has stated, the question of the legitimacy of the Emperor Paul is a mystery which the memoirs leave unsolved. Maroger has read more into Catherine's statements on the subject than is justified.

As those who are familiar with this work are aware, the memoirs break off suddenly in 1759 in the midst of an intimate conversation between Empress Elizabeth and Catherine concerning Grand Duke Peter. Whether this was by accident or intent has thus far never been determined. The editor has attempted to fill in the gap of Catherine's accession and reign (1762-1796) by means of a ten-page epilogue. Although this is adequately written and is followed by a well-selected, carefully annotated collection of notes, letters, and autobiographical fragments from the Empress' own hand, one regrets having to accept these as substitutes for the delightful fare Catherine has earlier provided.

In the over-all presentation and translation of the work the editor and translator have performed their tasks with intelligence and skill.

With the exception of some added passages, the Maroger edition closely follows the St. Petersburg edition of 1907; this is a point in its favor. It is free from the impassioned introductory notes of the Herzen edition and from the arbitrary re-arrangement of materials in the Boehme and Anthony editions. While the editor's notes are not numerous, they are ample and to the point. The portrait reproductions enhance the interest of the text. It is a pity, however, that a better portrait of Catherine could not have been found than the one in the frontispiece. Almost any one of the dozen portraits of the Empress in the 1907 edition, for example, would have been an improvement. This, however, is a very minor disappointment. The editor and publisher have furnished the reader with a faithful and tasteful edition of a work that is of great interest to Russian history. For this they are to be warmly commended.

C. BICKFORD O'BRIEN

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POWSTENKO, OLEXA. *The Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev*. New York, The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1954. 471 pp., 136 illustrations and 200 plates. \$12.50.

Of all the great medieval Christian monuments, the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev is surely the least known, the most altered, and, in its present condition, the most difficult for the western scholar to understand. It was founded by Yaroslav the Wise, Great Prince of Kievan Russia between 1017 and 1037, consecrated by 1049, and largely completed by 1062. But hardly had the

last details of its rich adornment of mosaics and frescoes been completed than the plague of evils commenced which has afflicted it ever since. It was first sacked in 1169 by a rebellious prince of Suzdal, and again in 1240, 1416, and 1482 by the Mongols. For long years it lay neglected and ruined until in the seventeenth century systematic, but erratic, reconstruction was undertaken in the style of the Polish-Ukrainian Baroque. In the nineteenth century further vandalism was practised in the name of "restoration;" the frescoes were repainted in oils, the eleventh-century mosaic floor destroyed to install a hot air heating system, and the western facade disfigured by lumpy buttresses which destroy the scale of the structure. Nor was the cathedral to be spared in modern times. It was bombed during the Civil War in 1918, plundered of its remaining ritual furnishings, and secularized by the Soviet government in the later 1930's, and finally sacked by the Germans in 1941-1943. If what remains is still of paramount concern not only to medievalists, but to all who revere noble architectural achievements, we must honor Yaroslav and his builders who had the vision to conceive and the knowledge with which to raise a monument which neither war, religious strife, nor political dissension has been able to obliterate.

In collecting the largest body of photographic materials yet made available on the past and present conditions of the fabric of St. Sophia and its interior decoration, Mr. Powstenko has made a signal contribution to medieval Russian studies. His 200 plates, of which the most recent are sharp and clear while the older ones are invaluable as documents, reveal the extent, the beauty,

and the importance of this monument. The photographs of the frescoes, especially, will prove a revelation of the majestic dignity of early Kievan art, and will raise for the Byzantine scholar important and perhaps finally soluble problems of attribution and style. In addition, the author has provided a full illustrative summary of the most recent conjectural restorations of the church and a series of comparative plans.

The text, in English and Ukrainian, which accompanies this notable material consists of a brief résumé of recent and even earlier theories about the origin of the plan and structure of St. Sophia. The author, writing from the point of view of a Ukrainian, tends to minimize the possibility of either Constantinopolitan or Eastern influences. But although we may be interested in his contention that the virtues of the great church are specifically Ukrainian rather than provincially Byzantine or prophetically Russian, the fact remains that some larger reference is required to account for a masonry church of this size and splendor erected in a city which only a generation before had been a pagan settlement composed, we must believe, of wooden dwellings. His derivation of the plan from Vladimir's Church of the Tithe (the Desyatinnaya) is pertinent, but for that church too we must look for sources in the world of which Kiev was then only a peripheral element. The American reader will be particularly interested in the illustrations on pages 78-81 where Professor Kenneth Conant's beautiful drawings of his proposed restoration are juxtaposed with the model prepared by the St. Sophia Architectural and Historical Museum. In Mr. Powstenko's opinion these two very

similar conceptions must, for the time being, be regarded as the most plausible conceptions of the original appearance of the church.

In his treatment of the frescoes and mosaics the author merely describes the subject matter; problems of iconography and attribution will have to be examined subsequently by the specialists concerned with these matters. There are no text references to the figures and plates, nor any indication of the source or date of the separate photographic materials. A project of this kind also requires a more detailed treatment of plans and sections with complete measurements.

But one may be grateful for the short, final section on the buildings of the Cathedral precinct. The photographs of the Bell Tower, begun in the seventeenth century and successively reconstructed, are particularly useful for the study of later Russian architecture. Indeed, as a source for visual information on the history and present state of this great church, this volume is indispensable.

GEORGE HEARD HAMILTON
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ATAMIAN, SARKIS. *The Armenian Community. The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict.* New York, Philosophical Library, 1955. 479 pp. \$4.75.

In this well-documented study the author, a former member of the University of Rhode Island's Sociology Department, presents a detailed and authoritative study of recent Armenian history from the Dashnak point of view. After a masterly introductory chapter by J.

H. Tashjian, summarizing Armenian history up to the Ottoman period, Professor Atamian discusses the status of the Armenians under the Ottoman "Millet" system, both in terms of historical evolution and sociological analysis. A particular merit of this work is in pointing out that, contrary to the conventional stereotype, it was not the Levantine shop-keeper of the cities, but the sturdy peasant of the hinterland that was the true representative of the Armenian people.

A period of liberal reforms forced on the Ottoman government, as a result of the Crimean War, coincided with the beginnings of Armenian national consciousness and the rise of an Armenian intelligentsia, mainly in Russian Armenia. Among the Armenian political parties that developed, the Dashnak Party, an originally militant, socialist movement for independence, played a decisive role, first by its use of force in defence of the Armenian minority against oppression under Abdul Hamid II and then as temporary allies of the Young Turk reformers and as Armenian representatives in the Ottoman parliament. During the First World War the Young Turk rulers made the Armenians of Turkey responsible for the support of Russian Armenians of the Allies and exterminated most of the Armenian population in Ottoman territory.

Mr. Atamian shows how the present political attitudes of a large part of the Armenian community in the United States is conditioned by the memory that the independent Armenian Republic, which developed in the period 1918-1920, as a result of the Ottoman collapse and the Russian Revolution, was sacrificed by the Western Allies to Kemalist

Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne, in spite of President Wilson's territorial arbitration in favor of an independent Armenia. On the basis of a thorough documentation, mainly from the Armenian language press of the United States, the author shows how its present political schism revolves largely around divergent attitudes toward Soviet Armenia. The issue is whether the Communist occupation of the Armenian Republic, together with subsequent Soviet oppression, is to be considered a lesser evil, as compared with Young Turk and Kemalist genocide or not. The fact that the head of the Armenian (monophysite, "Gregorian") Church, the Catholicos of Echmiadzin, is dependent on the Soviet rulers gives particular significance to this inter-Armenian conflict, which culminated in 1933 in the assassination of Archbishop Tourian during a Christmas high mass in a New York church. The author makes impressive use of modern sociological and psychological methodology as a foundation for the particular Dashnak viewpoint concerning these events, whose standpoint considers, for the present, not Turkey but the Soviet Union as the main enemy of Armenian nationhood.

In addition to published English materials, the author uses to good advantage personal interviews with participants as well as published and unpublished Armenian sources. A valuable contribution of this book is new information on the significant Armenian-Kurdish relations.

A few minor controversial points can hardly detract from the general value of this work. Thus, the negative evaluation of Islam (pp. 133 ff.) seems to this reviewer one-sided. Until the eighteenth century the

position of religious minorities in the Christian West was hardly better than under the Islamic Osmanlis and probably worse. The responsibility of Imperial Germany for the Armenian genocide of 1915 has been one of omission, not of commission, and seems vastly exaggerated. The Armenians of Persia are not discussed at all, nor are the Russian Armenians (no Russian sources are

cited), in spite of the Russian-Armenian ideological origin of the Dashnak Party itself. Thus the very significant Russian Populist (*Narodnik*) influences on the Armenian intelligentsia and Dashnak ideology are not mentioned at all, not even in connection with Nalbandian's slogan "Land and Liberty."

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